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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
DO PAYMENTS FOR HYDROLOGICAL SERVICES REDUCE POVERTY AND
STRENGTHEN SOCIAL CAPITAL? AN EXAMINATION OF HOUSEHOLD
WELFARE AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE SIERRA NORTE OF OAXACA,
MEXICO
by
Lindsey Roland Nieratka
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Pallab Mozumder, Major Professor
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is a method of attaching market
value to environmental benefits which have typically not been valued in the marketplace.
This thesis investigates the impact of the government hydrological services program in
two communities in Oaxaca, Mexico. Using interviews, semi structured and household
surveys, I investigate the effect the PSAH has had in alleviating poverty and increasing
social capital in the communities as well as investigate willingness to accept (WTA)
payment for additional PES programs. The PES payments put household incomes above
national poverty lines. Social capital improved both within and between communities.
WTA for additional PES depends on the use of the land in question.
participation in the PSAH has had a positive impact in both communities.
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CHAPTER I –OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is a method of attaching market
value to benefits received from the environment which have typically not been valued in
the marketplace for the purpose of providing an incentive and economic rationale for
conservation (Engel et al. 2008). Payment for Environmental Services programs strive to
achieve conservation by making it economically viable through making direct
connections between those who utilize services provided by nature, such as water, and
those who protect the land or processes that allow the service production (Wunder 2005).
Particularly in Latin America, PES have been increasingly more common, and Mexico
currently boasts one of the world’s largest PES schemes in scale and scope, paying for
carbon, biodiversity, agroforestry and water (Corbera et al. 2009, Brauman et al. 2007,
Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008), although the carbon capture program was curtailed in recent
years as a result of uncertainties in the carbon prices and the presence of voluntary
markets.
My study will examine payments for hydrological services currently being
received by two communities in the Sierra Norte region of Oaxaca, Mexico. Under the
land tenure system in Mexico an estimated 60-70% of forests are owned communally by
two forms of state-regulated common property called ejidos or comunidades.

The

Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) started a process of land and forest redistribution and
also established agrarian legislation for two forms of agrarian reform community
governance.

Ejidos are agrarian units of previously landless peasants who were

1

collectively given a parcel of land. Comunidades are indigenous communities that have
been given legal tenure to lands that they traditionally inhabited. In the Sierra Norte of
Oaxaca, seven comunidades have joined together to form an inter-community
organization called the Committee of Natural Resources of the Chinantla Alta (comite de
recursos naturales de la Chinantla Alta) or CORENCHI. The organization created a
coordinated governance structure under which the seven community-owned forests are to
be managed. As CORENCHI, the communities have declared portions of these forests as
Community Conserved Areas (CCAs) in order to gain recognition from the government,
with CCAs now officially recognized as part of Mexico’s national protected areas system
under new legislation in 2008. The seven communities share a common ethnic
background as Chinantec indigenous peoples and relatively large territories (>32,000 ha
in total), large portions of which are not suitable for agriculture and so have historically
been left unexploited.
Six of the seven CORENCHI communities are currently receiving payments as
part of Mexico’s Payments for Hydrological Services program (PSAH, pagos de
servicios ambientales hidrologicos), established in 2003. My study will focus on two of
the seven communities, Santa Cruz Tepetotutla and San Pedro Tlatepusco. Through
semi-structured and structured surveys, my study will determine the steps that led to the
community applying for and receiving the government payments for PSAH, the
communal decision-making process that determines who benefits and how the funding in
distributed and the impact of the payments in terms of community social capital,
community benefits and household welfare. In addition, I will investigate community
willingness to accept (WTA) payments in order to expand the program for the inclusion
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of other ecosystem services. This question will be asked under three circumstances;
WTA for payments within the conservation area, WTA for payments requiring changes
to private coffee plots and WTA for a project that would require restoring an area
covered by an invasive pest plant.
Mexican land reform and the social structure and organization of the two
communities in our study differentiate the current study from most others published
studies. In the case of the CORENCHI communities, the hydrologic services are being
provided by land uses and forest conservation under a common property regime. This
common property regime as well as support from local non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and the specifics of the government program allow the CORENCHI
communities to avoid many of the common barriers of poor participation in PES
programs

and improves equity to poor participants(Landell Mills and Porras 2002,

Wunder 2008). The existing literature on PES has few examples of PES in a common
property regime and none of the existing studies take place in communities with the
governance structure found in my two study communities or with similar payment
distribution schemes as that which will be presented here. My study can offer a unique
perspective into the PES literature.

LITERATURE REVIEW
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Humans derive many benefits from nature.

The types of services that are

provided by natural systems include provisioning services such as water, regulating
services, such as climate regulation through carbon sequestration, and cultural and
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supporting services, such as biodiversity. These services are referred to generally as
environmental or ecosystem services. The terms ecosystem services and environmental
services are often used almost interchangeably. Ecosystem services usually refer to
benefits from natural unaltered ecosystems and environmental services refer to the
benefits associated with ecosystems whether they are natural or managed. In this thesis, I
will use the term environmental services because it is an all-encompassing term. The
concept of environmental services is used for the purpose of creating or revisiting the
understanding that we are dependent on natural systems and that they provide services
that cannot be sufficiently mimicked by technology. The ecosystem services framework
allows these services to be quantified, providing a common metric for weighing them
against other land uses (Brauman et al. 2007).
Environmental resources are often contained on private property.

Privately

owned environmental services allow for economic growth but compartmentalizing the
services also can create externalities that cross property boundaries. Using markets to
solve problems of externalities only increases the separation.

To connect resource

“owners,” Vatn (2009) and Brauman et al. (2007) suggest some solutions. The first
solution is the creation of common property and a common governance structure.
Second, they suggest state ownership in the form of protected areas or command and
control regulation on actions on private property. The third suggestion is to create new
markets where the externalities between properties can be traded in a voluntary exchange.
Fourth, government incentives can be established to conserve land to produce the desired
services. These third and fourth recommendations justify programs for payments for
environmental services. In the Mexican case I will be considering, a common pool

4

resource and common property regime were not created for the sake of the program but
were previously created by state action. Thus, my example shows the use of the first,
third and fourth recommendations in a single program.
Before there was a framework for quantifying environmental services they were
given a value of zero in cost/benefit analyses making them unable to influence decision
making. By providing a value for ecosystem services we are creating a common metric
by which we can compare land uses. Most often this metric is created by considering a
single service, such as water quality allowing meaningful decisions to be made about the
most efficient and profitable land use (Brauman et al. 2007).
The environmental service approach aims to combine ecological and economic
outcomes in order to appropriately make tradeoffs in natural resource management,
balance goals and make decisions about the allocation of resources (Wainger et al. 2010).
An element in deciding the value of a service is to identify alternatives to the service,
such as water treatment systems as an alternative to watershed protection. The cost must
also include all impacts both biologically and socially on long and short terms and be
based not just on opportunity costs, but on substitution of the service with technology and
the quality of the service (Wainger et al. 2010). Determining the true value of a service
will require a better scientific understanding about the connection between the land use
and the desired service.
The water provided by forests is a common pool resource in that it is nonexcludable and rival. No one can be prevented from using them but one person’s
consumption can affect another’s. This provides no incentive for service users to pay
providers as they can access the good without payment, thus encouraging free riders.
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Free riders result in a market failure that, in terms of forest services, means that there is
under investment in the protection of the services through forest management, protection,
or establishment of protected areas (Landell Mills and Porras 2002). Common pool
resources are most effectively managed through collective action and, for economists,
justify government intervention rather than a market approach so that the government
ensures the provision of the goods (Landell Mills and Porras 2002). However, Stavins
(2000) shows that well designed market approaches can achieve environmental goals at a
lower cost and with more positive incentives to continue innovating and improving than
command and control approaches.

Financial incentives require government subsidy

while markets for Environmental Services (ES) require that users pay for the service and
the price is controlled by supply and demand, which should be more efficient than
government set prices (Landell Mills and Porras 2002).

PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Wunder (2005) defines PES with the following five criteria:
1. A voluntary transaction where
2. A well defined environmental service (or a land use expected to provide that
service)
3. Is being bought by a minimum of one seller
4. By a minimum of one provider
5. If and only if the environmental service provider secures the provision of the
environmental service

6

According to Engel et al. (2008), PES is an appropriate policy mechanism for
protection of public goods, such as water, when the providing ecosystems are
mismanaged because the managers perceive benefits as externalities.

It should be

remembered that the objectives of PES programs are first and foremost for environmental
protection and secondly for human well being. Although the stated goal of PES is not
poverty alleviation, in order to be effective the payment must at least be more than the
payoff of an alternative land use (Engel et al. 2008) and thus have the potential to provide
larger incomes than the alternative land uses. Payments for environmental services
programs are seen as more efficient than command and control because they are more
adaptable and flexible to fit the specific details of each case. As well, command and
control are likely to be either unenforced or put unreasonable restrictions on use (Engel et
al. 2008).
The Coase theorem is the conceptual framework from which the idea of payments
for environmental services stems. It states that when there is a direct connection and open
dialogue between users and providers an efficient outcome will result (Coase 1960,
Kosoy et al. 2007, Engel et al. 2008). Environmental services are seen as positive
externalities resulting from healthy ecosystems and PES programs are meant to create the
forum for upstream providers and downstream users to come to an agreement on land
uses by users compensating providers for the cost of providing the service.

This

“beneficiary pays” approach differs from the standard “polluter pays” approach of
pollution abatement and it takes the burden and cost of environmental protection off the
land owners (Kosoy et al. 2007). Polluter pays is utilized in most cases of pollution when
the polluter is a corporation and to have the beneficiaries pay for the cost of pollution
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abatement would cause perverse incentives for the polluter to continue polluting. A
beneficiary pays strategy like PES is a valuable tool when the owners of the land of
interest are poor or marginalized.
Most of the globe’s water resources originate in mountainous areas but are used in
floodplains, deltas and coastal transitional zones meaning that the users of the resource
are a significant distance apart from those that provide them (Garrido and Dinar 2009,
Pagiola 2002). As a result, those who are concerned with water quality and land use are
generally not the same nor are they connected (Wang 2001). This disconnect is both
physical but also cultural and socio-economic.

It is common for development in

mountainous regions to be behind development in other areas, causing the residents in
water providing areas to be poorer and often more marginalized than downstream users.
This is a phenomenon that occurs in both developed and underdeveloped countries
(Garrido and Dinar 2009).

In the case of the Mexican PSAH the issue of lack of

connection between upstream and downstream user has been dealt with by the
government serving as an intermediary. The government agency is ideally creating a
situation that is beneficial for both groups of users.

Attempts by the Mexican

government to make the PSAH a more direct, market based program have largely
dissolved into the current new initiative of matching funds, known locally as “fondos
concurrente.” These will be explained in more detail later.
Payment for environmental services programs have not been without their critics.
Often they are critiqued for being inefficient economically and environmentally, unfair or
inequitable or illegitimate (Wunder 2006). These critiques do not negate the usefulness
of PES. Inefficiency because of job losses, costs of enforcement and land can be dealt
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with through strong governance, upstream job creation as a result of program activities
and excludability even where land tenure is weak (Wunder 2006).

Restrictions of the

PES program may restrict other development opportunities. Fairness and equity can be
achieved as PES programs in fact bring in rare financial capital, creating opportunity that
would not otherwise have been present, as well as diverse non-income benefits such as
international NGO attention, increased social organization and capacity building among
participants, thus opening up many investment and development opportunities that will
not interfere with the PES program goals. Illegitimacy is assumed because of restrictions
on the development of land. However, if carefully designed, PES has the ability to
increase opportunities. Also, PES programs are by definition voluntary meaning that if at
any time a service provider feels they are being unfairly treated or restricted, they can
remove themselves from the agreement (Wunder 2006).
Projects that do not have a direct market between service user and service
provider have been referred to by many names including Compensation or Rewards for
Ecosystem Services, Markets for Ecosystem Services, International Payments for
Environmental Services, or “PES-like.” These classifications make these programs seem
inferior to PES programs which are considered those that follow the original 5-point
definition (Wunder 2005, Sommerville et al. 2009). For this reason, new definitions of
PES have been developed. Muradian et al. (2009) conceptualize PES as “a transfer of
resources between social actors which aims to create incentives to align individual and/or
collective land use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural
resources” (Muradian et al. 2009).

Sommerville et al. (2009) believe that PES should

be used as a blanket term for a wide range of incentive programs. According to these
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authors, the framework for PES should consist of two main criteria and two principles.
They define PES as an approach with the “aim to (1) transfer positive incentives to
service providers that are (2) conditional on the provision of the service, where successful
implementation is based on a consideration of (1) additionality and (2) varying
institutional contexts.” (Sommerville et al. 2009). In Mexico, the PSAH gives cash
payments to service providers as an incentive to conserve. Additionality, benefits that
would not have otherwise been provided without the program, is not a large consideration
in the PSAH as payments are often given for forests that are not under the risk of
deforestation.
Within these two definitions, collective action is needed to coordinate all actors
(buyers, users, intermediaries) so that there results a socially desirable outcome. PES
should have the goal of giving incentives for the provision of environmental services so
that behavior for the good of the individual or group is altered away from being
destructive to the environment and turned towards protection. However, some evidence
suggests that without internal incentives towards conservation, economic incentives may
not be enough to change behavior (Muradian et al. 2009). In the communities addressed
in this study there is a strong internal culture of conservation which aids in the
effectiveness of the economic incentive.
The new definitions of PES presented here take away the need to make the
program economically efficient or to function as a market (Muradian et al. 2009). Also,
it allows PES to function without complete information and allows that under some
institutional contexts where land use change may be illegal, PES may not be strictly
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voluntary (Sommerville et al. 2009). The definitions do not distinguish between PES and
“PES-like.” (Muradian et al. 2009, Sommerville et al. 2009).

PES Efficiency
Several authors write about the requirements for effective PES. The following list
of efficiency requirements is synthesized from Kosoy et al. (2007), Wunder et al. (2008)
and Pagiola et al. (2005).
1. The compensation received by land owners should be at least equal to the
opportunity costs of the land use.
2. The compensation received by land owners should be lower than the actual value
of the negative externalities resulting from land use change.
3. Service providers must be enrolled in the PES program, any services provided by
non participants cannot be considered as a benefit.
4. Compliance must be monitored, often through site visits and satellite imagery.
5. Compliance must lead to a change in land use – additionality, benefits that would
not exist without the program, is easiest to measure in programs where there is a
clear land use change required, such as reforestation, and more difficult when the
result is avoided deforestation.
6. The land use under the program must provide the desired service – Water services
are not easy to directly measure and observe. Because of this assumptions are
made about the relationship of land use to provided services and these land uses
are used as a proxy measure of service provision. Because of these uniform
payments per hectare of forested land are offered, as in Mexico, with higher
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prices for forest types that are considered more hydrologically valuable, such as
cloud forest in Mexico. Benefits to water services from forest cover are largely
assumed and the conservation of forests is largely based on the precautionary
principal.
7. There should be some permanence – assurance that the service will be supplied
for a long term – which may include raising the payments when alternative land
uses become more economically attractive
8. Limited leakage, or moving undesired land uses to another area. This is not as
important in water PES programs where the goal is to protect hydrologically
important areas and undesired activities are moved to a less hydrologically
important area but may be important for programs of biodiversity or carbon
payments if deforestation is moved to a new area.
9. Prevention of the creation of perverse incentives that may result when promoting
enrollment of only land at high risk of degradation.
10. Recipients of payments should be chosen on criteria that increase the provision of
the ES while decreasing the risk of losing the ES. Criteria based on other factors,
such as poverty alleviation, should not be used.
Efficiency in environmental service provision is difficult to measure as there is
often not a direct measurable relationship between land use and the services provided,
with the provision of services often being implied by cultural beliefs rather than scientific
evidence. This is particularly true for water services (Pascual et al. 2009). The costs of
creating a monitoring system to better capture the relationship may be prohibitive.
Where there are high levels of uncertainty between the actions being rewarded and the
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desired service, Coasian designs are not feasible as there is not enough information
available for open discussion and decision making (Pascual et al. 2009).
There are issues of equity that must be addressed when implementing PES
programs. Is it more equitable to give payments on the basis of the contributions of a
provider or to give payments to those with the most economic need? Can income be used
as a measure of equity, particularly in situations where values such as social capital are
important or where the actions of setting aside land prevent the participants from other
livelihood increasing activities? In the example of my study sites, within the community
equity is dealt with in two ways. First, every community member who fulfills their duties
to the community is given an equal share of the funds. Second, decisions about how the
money is distributed or used within the community are made on the basis of majority rule
in community assemblies in which every member gets a vote. Though there are other
examples of PES programs functioning within a community (Logan and Moseley 2002,
Huang et al. 2007), none of the examples in the literature outside of Mexico show a
community level decision making structure such as this one.
Equity is based on a baseline and a pool of relevant stakeholders. Efficiency is
dependent on additionality, value of the services and the cost of implementation. On the
basis of these factors it is determined that PES designs that pay for common goods or
those that are egalitarian (paying the same to each provider) are high in equity but low in
efficiency (Pascual et al. 2009). Schemes that are compensation for conservation rather
than payments can have low efficiency if there is no additionality and high equity if those
being compensated are poor or indigenous groups. The latter may be true in my study
sites.
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Pascual et al. (2009) argue that the PSAH program has positive equity but
negative efficiency. Their assessment is largely based on three factors, willingness to
pay, willingness to accept and the cost of implementation. In the PSAH the cost of
implementation is borne mainly by the government agency CONAFOR with the cost to
the communities being low.

For efficiency, payments must lie between minimum

willingness to accept of providers and maximum willingness to pay by users or
government (Pagiola et al. 2005). Willingness to accept also is low for the PSAH because
there is little opportunity cost. This is the case in the two study communities, as will be
seen later. The PSAH is set at just above the average opportunity costs, ideally just
enough to tip the scale toward conservation. Willingness to pay is not assessed because
the payments come from water user fees which were in place before the initiation of the
program.
Alix-Garcia (2004) determined that if the PSAH program in Mexico was targeted
toward areas of greatest hydrologic importance they could quadruple the ES benefits.
Currently however the majority of participants in PSAH are located in aquifers that are
not overexploited and where there was not a high risk of deforestation (Alix-Garcia et al.
2009) as is the case in the study communities studied in this thesis. Alix-Garcia et al.
(2009) found that in most cases the amount of money offered for the PSAH was not
enough to create a behavior change.

In the case of my study, most of the behavioral

changes had been self imposed by the communities before they began participating in the
PSAH and thus the money is not so much a reason to change behavior but rather a reward
for the behavior they already exhibited.
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PES AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
One question that has been prevalent in the literature is whether or not PES can be
used as a tool for poverty alleviation (Landell Mills and Porras 2002, Pagiola et al. 2005,
Bulte et al. 2008, Wunder et al. 2008). Wunder (2001) identifies four pathways out of
poverty and PES has the potential to address them all.

First, PES can lead to

diversification into non-farm activities by providing financial capital and reducing risk
associated with change. Second, PES can lead to and be affected by labor movement and
relocation. Migration out of rural areas to cities relieves some pressure on forests and
creates more available land to enter into PES. As rural families have more income they
may choose to use it to send children to cities to study and work. The third and fourth
pathways are traditional rural development and aid and public investments. In many
cases PES is not a direct market approach but rather, as described by McAffee and
Shapiro (2010), a compensation program or direct subsidy. When PES programs are
designed in this way they can provide money for further investment into conservation or
may result in the investment of money into public goods, as is seen in the case study by
Alix-Garcia (2009).
Potential participants in PES should neither be included in nor excluded from the
program because of their socioeconomic status as this could undermine the real
environmental goals of the programs. However, in many places the poor are largely the
ones who are responsible for undeveloped land and thus those providing the desired
services. Where this is the case PES has the potential to be a poverty alleviating tool
(Pagiola et al. 2010). For example, in Mexico, much of the remaining forested land is
owned by poor comunidades or ejidos.

15

Case studies compared by Wunder et al. (2008) show that whether targeted or not,
the poor often are able to gain access to PES programs and generally benefit from them.
Because PES is a voluntary program it assumes that land owners (service providers) are
at least no worse off than they were before (Pagiola et al. 2005).

However, the

willingness to accept (WTA) of the poor may be skewed so that they may not be able to
refuse even the smallest of offerings, making their involvement questioningly voluntary
(Muradian et al. 2009). Because the poor have lower opportunity costs than the wealthy,
lower prices can be offered to the poor allowing more land to be entered into the
program, placing the burden of conservation on the poor (Muradian et al. 2009). Another
concern for the poor is that the payments will increase the value of land which will give
an incentive for more powerful to take it over (Pagiola et al. 2005). In the case of the
PSAH in Mexico, prices are set according to the type of forest enrolled in the program
and not based on the opportunity cost of the individual participants. Also, because of the
land tenure system, there is no fear that land will be bought up by the wealthy as the
value increases.
In Latin America many poor have been interested in participation in PES
programs (Pagiola et al. 2010). One reason is that PES is less risky than crop production
because as long as the regulations of the PES contract are followed, an annual payment is
guaranteed for the time period of the contract. In comparison to crops that may fail, be
subject to uncontrollable environmental disasters, or be neglected because health or other
personal issues prevent labor from being available, PES is much less risky. This low risk
may explain the popularity of the idea of PES in Mexico and Costa Rica where
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applications to participate offer three times the amount of land than funding available
(Pagiola et al. 2010).
One study of poor participation in a PES in Columbia showed that the poor were
able to participate at a similar level as the better off and that the main factors influencing
participation came from remoteness and size of farms (Pagiola et al. 2010). This and
most other PES studies concentrate on individual farmers and land owners. The study
presented in this paper will consider poor participation when the service is a common
pool resource under a common property regime.
Since PES programs are typically voluntary, a main way to increase the ability of
PES to alleviate poverty is to remove any barriers to participation by the poor. Several
authors have outlined the most common boundaries to poor participation in PES (Wunder
2008, Pagiola et al. 2005, Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). The first barrier facing the
poor is eligibility, meaning whether or not they own land and if the land produces the
target services. Under Mexican law the land tenure of the comunidades is clear and
legally secure.

In the case of the CORENCHI communities, their land contains

hydrologically important forest types based on the guidelines of the PSAH program,
namely cloud forest, which is situated within the Papaloapan watershed, one of the
largest in Mexico. The second barrier to participation outlined by Wunder (2008) is
desire to participate. Reasons that some poor may not desire participation is if other uses
of the land may seem more favorable (high opportunity cost), the amount of risk involved
in participation and whether there is trust in the buyer or intermediary.

My study

communities have practiced conservation of their forests for generations and, before
participation in the program, had decided against extractive land use options. Thus,
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opportunity cost for the community is low and there is little to lose from participation.
Opportunity cost for individuals within the community might differ. The intermediary in
the PSAH is a government agency and five year contracts are guaranteed. A trusted
NGO, Geoconservación, introduced the communities to the program allowing the
community leaders to have trust in the program itself. Geoconservación itself was
introduced to the communities in the first place by a trusted intermediary who later
became the state delegate for CONAFOR, Salvador Anta. The third restriction is the
ability to participate.

Ability may be limited by organization or capital.

The

communities have a well established internal organization and a standing relationship
with Geoconservación which allows them to relatively effortlessly, in terms of relatively
lower transaction costs, and handle the organization necessary to participate. The final
barrier is relative competitiveness. Competitiveness comes in the form of reliability and
low transaction costs. The communities are reliable because they have a long history of
conservation; there is relatively little risk on the buyer side that the communities will not
honor the arrangement. Transaction costs can be kept low because the land included in
the program is owned neither by a single nor many individual land owners. Rather, the
land entered into the program is owned by the community as a group and the payments
made to the community organization rather than individual small land owners. Thus the
community itself is the single beneficiary of the payment and distribution of the money
within the organization is done based on internal decision making. The costs of the
PSAH program are significantly lowered by this as only one application need be
processed and one payment given by the buyer.
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Poverty in Mexico
Poverty in Mexico is defined by the Social Development Secretary (Secretaría de
Desarrollo Social or SEDESOL) in three levels. The highest level of poverty is known
as nutritional poverty meaning that a family is unable to meet basic nutritional
requirements. This level of poverty was defined in 2002 as any per capita household
income below 15.4 pesos per person per day. The next poverty level is capability poverty
and is defined as the inability to cover basic nutritional needs, health costs and education.
In 2002 this level of poverty was considered any per capita household income that
provides less than 18.9 pesos per person per day. The lowest level of poverty is asset
poverty any per capita household income that does not meet the costs of basic nutrition,
clothing, housing, healthcare, public transportation and education. This level, in 2002,
was 28.1 pesos per person per day. These numbers are for rural households, the poverty
lines for urban households are higher (SEDESOL 2002).

CASE STUDIES
My thesis will present a case study of a PES program, the PSAH in Mexico,
within two communities with a common property regime and strong internal governance.
Many case studies have already been done on existing PES programs. These case studies
mainly focus on individual land owners (Kosoy et al. 2007, Southgate et al. 2009) or on
contracted restoration workers (Turpie et al. 2008).

In fact, Wunder et al. (2008)

looked at fourteen PES programs in developed and developing countries and only two,
the PSAH in Mexico and the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe, cite the providers as
communal land owners. Other programs exist which give payments to communities or
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groups of individuals. In Asia, the RUPES program encourages small land owners to
form groups to receive payments as their land holdings are too small to be efficiently paid
for (Huang et al. 2007, Kerr 2002). The CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe provides
capital to communities to initiate revenue generating wildlife management programs.
However, the rules, decisions and enforcement of CAMPFIRE are done at the district
government level and not by the communities themselves (Logan and Moseley 2002). In
Pimampiro, Ecuador, payments are given to members of a cooperative of cattle and
potato farmers. Not all members of the cooperative participate in the PES program and
not all members of the community are members of the cooperative (Southgate and
Wunder 2009). In other common property situations PES is not given in cash payments
but rather in the form of conservation and development programs (Southgate and Wunder
2009).

An attempt in Brazil to organize landowners together to receive the PES,

Proambiente, has been largely unsuccessful and lacking in collective action and
communal governance (Southgate and Wunder 2009). From these studies I can conclude
that a study of a PES program functioning in a community with a strong common
property regime and with strong internal governance deciding restrictions on land use and
on distribution of payments where every man, woman and child in the community is
involved in the program, is rare in the literature.
Some work has already been done in Mexico to study the effect of the PSAH in
comunidades and ejidos. In one case study by Alix-Garcia et al. (2009), in all but one
case where 100% of the money was evenly distributed among members, anywhere from
3% to 100% of money received from payments for hydrologic services was invested into
a public good such as equipment for the forestry activities and community infrastructure.
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The ejidos may have chosen to distribute funds into public goods because investing in
public goods seems more fair and egalitarian, allowing non-member residents to benefit
as well. Investments into public goods may see a higher return than handing out annual
cash payments. In all but two of the cases the receipt and distribution of payments did
not change the social dynamics of the community. Where it did, the PES program was on
land held privately, not communally, and the owners of the land were able to use that as
leverage for demands of more payment. In one case participation in the PES led to an
increase in environmental awareness. One of the factors causing this was likely that the
payments were not distributed equally among members but distributed according to
participation in activities deemed necessary for participation in the program (Alix-Garcia
et al. 2009). My study also looks at communities where part of the PSAH money is
invested into public goods but will go more in depth into the social processes of decision
making and contribution of the PSAH to collective action.

COMMON PROPERTY
Conservation can be seen as a commons issue. Watershed services are considered
common pool resources. As common pool resources the benefits from watersheds are
controlled and then utilized by many different stakeholders leading to rivalry in use
(Kosoy et al. 2007). Water is a public good meaning that in most cases it is non
excludable. People generally do not pay for these services and willingness to pay cannot
be determined by demand (Brauman et al. 2007). Since water is a public good, pricing
needs to include social value and social equity.
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Protecting these services is often

considered to be collectively beneficial but can be individually costly (Kosoy et al.
2007).
When the phrase “common property” is used many might immediately think of
the “tragedy of the commons,” an idea put forth by Garrett Hardin in 1968 to describe the
outcome of multiple individuals using a limited resource and acting independently. This
The “tragedy of the commons” is better referred to as the tragedy of open access as
common property actually implies a framework of rules regarding use. The tragedy of
open access happens when rational agents are unlikely to cooperate even when it is in
their mutual best interest (Hardin 1968, Ostrom 2000). Much of environmental policy
has been built on the assumption that individuals are unable to overcome problems of
cooperation in order to achieve a mutual benefit by working collectively and so
externally enforced regulations are used to control these resources (Ostrom 2000). A
great deal of field experience shows this to not always be true as individuals around the
world in different cultures and situations have organized themselves voluntarily to
achieve benefits from trade, natural resources and risk protection. Evidence shows that
externally enforced rules can crowd out voluntary cooperation. Free riding is a problem,
but self organized governance often invests resources into the avoidance of free riders
(Ostrom 2000).
Experimental evidence shows that there are multiple types of individuals who all
accept different behaviors for collective action (Ostrom 2000). Experiments have found
that those who believe others will cooperate are more likely to cooperate themselves and,
in game theory experiments, as the number of rounds played increases and the game is
learned better cooperation increases. Communication between subjects and the existence
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of punishment for non-cooperators also increases cooperation (Ostrom 2000). Thanks to
these experiments, multiple types of “players” in public goods “games” have been
identified.

There are four main types: norm using, conditional cooperators, willing

punishers and rational egoists. Conditional cooperators are trusting and trust worthy and
will initiate cooperation when they feel others will reciprocate. Willing punishers will
punish free riders and together with conditional cooperators create an ideal situation for
collective action by creating an environment where there is both trust and punishment for
those who violate that trust (Ostrom 2000). Humans have an evolved ability to learn
social norms and to check for cheaters of these norms (Ostrom 2000). Conditional
cooperators will more frequently receive a higher payoff, since they are trustworthy,
while rational egoists will consistently receive a lower payoff since they will not be
trusted.

Where type is known, only the trustworthy will survive.

If there is no

information about a player’s type in a large population, only rational egoists will survive
(Ostrom 2000). Social norms have longer staying power than externally enforced rules
which may not be enforced or are subject to change (Ostrom 2000).
Public goods, such as environmental services, should face problems of overuse
and free-riding.

However, the above mentioned studies show that there are many

situations in which people are able to collectively manage these resources. Conditional
cooperation is responsible for much success in management of common public goods
(Rustagi et al. 2010). When groups are heterogeneous in their mix of cooperators, those
who are willing to cooperate are also willing to enforce cooperation even at a personal
cost (Rustagi et al. 2010). Activities such as forest management would only be possible
in communities which a high proportion of conditional cooperators not only because they
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are willing to cooperate but also because they are willing to enforce cooperation even if it
is at a personal cost (Rustagi et al. 2010). Because conditional cooperators will only
cooperate if they expect that others will as well, common property management will be
successful if there is governance in place that gives self interested individuals incentive to
cooperate and punishes those who do not (Rustagi et al. 2010). Because of the results
found in the study by Rustagi et al. (2010) that conditional cooperators are more willing
to provide costly enforcement, where costly enforcement exists cooperation should be
higher because of the larger number of conditional cooperators. With enforcement and
cultural transmission, behaviors which are beneficial for the group should spread through
the population (Rustagi et al. 2010). The communities in my study have a system in
place of mandatory civic participation, even at a personal cost. Those who participate
receive a portion of the money from the PSAH, providing incentive to cooperate, while
those who do not forfeit the benefits of the PSAH program. This system of civic
participation should encourage conditional cooperators to cooperate.
Common property management has been considered as effective as private
property in the efficiency of resource use (Agrawal 2001). In the body of field research
on collective action a common finding is that “when the users of a common pool resource
organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to
manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on
them.” (Ostrom 2000). Common property functions within the safety net of rules and
structure, both formal and informal.

These rules and structure make unpredictable

situations, such as the cooperation of multiple actors, into a predictable system (Rudd
2004). Agrawal (2001) synthesizes the characteristics necessary for successful commons
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management identified from three influential papers (Baland and Platteau 1996, Ostrom
1990 and Wade 1988 as referenced in Agrawal 2001). According to these authors,
resources that can be managed communally should be of a small size, or at least
stationary, well defined and predictable. The groups performing the management should
also be small with well defined boundaries, shared social norms and past successful
experience with collective action (e.g. strong social capital). The groups should also have
appropriate leadership, interdependence among group members and be similar in their
interests and social identity while containing different sets of skills, resources and
abilities and have low levels of poverty.

In terms of the connection between the

managers and the resource, the authors require that there be a geographic overlap
between the resource and the managers, a dependency of the managers on the resource
and a fair allocation of the resource among group members. There should also be a low
level of demand for the resource and any change in the demand should be gradual. In
terms of the institutional structure, rules governing resource use and group involvement
should be clear and easily understood, developed locally and easy to enforce.
Punishments for non-compliance should be graduated; the process to hold violators
accountable needs to be low cost and the officials monitoring compliance need to be held
accountable to group members and resource users. Additionally, the restrictions on the
resource should match the nature of the resource and its renewability. On top of these
internal factors, external factors influence the effectiveness of common property
management. First, exclusion technology needs to be low cost. There should be limited
use external markets and changes in the level of connection to the market should be
gradual. State governments cannot impede the process by undermining local authority
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and must create supporting sanctions (from Agrawal 2001). My study will investigate if
this holds true for non-extractive resource management.
Threats to collective action as a remedy to common pool resource issues do exist.
Immigration of individuals who do not share the existing social norms or emigration that
results in losing key players in the community can reduce trust. The imposition of
external rules, failures of transmission of knowledge between generation, over reliance
on outside sources of aid which may ignore indigenous knowledge, or the increase of
opportunism and corruption undermine collective action (Ostrom 2000).

PES and common property
Vatn (2009) looked at how PES could be used to strengthen cooperative will and
concluded the following. First, cooperation could be increased by ensuring land rights so
that land cannot be bought up by the wealthy and thereby reinforcing existing
inequalities. Cooperative will may possibly be improved by an assurance that working
together will result in a betterment of well-being. Payments for environmental services
can strengthen cooperation will since transaction costs are lower for paying communities
rather than individuals in my study, working together resulted in benefits.

If PES

programs favor this structure it may encourage its formation in many areas where there
was not previously community organization. For many services, like water, small parcels
may not provide the desired service but be part of a larger area required. If the payments
can only be offered if the entire area is under protection then this might encourage those
land owners to group together, and put pressure on those who are less willing, so that all
may benefit from the incentives.
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Social capital is a characteristic of communities described in terms of trust, norms
and networks that enable collective action (Bouma et al. 2008). Measuring social capital
has policy relevance in that social capital can increase the sustainability and success of
programs thus making them better investments of resources and effort. Social capital
provides insurance that when one person acts in compliance with community rules others
will as well (Bouma et al. 2008). This sense of accountability is one thing that Eleanor
Ostrom and others have cited as important for social action.

PES IN MEXICO
The need for forest/water conservation in Mexico
Mexico is a country plagued by deforestation and water scarcity. Of the 188 most
important aquifers in the country, two thirds are overexploited, with withdrawal at 190%
above the recharge rate and serving 30% of the population (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008, AlixGarcia et al. 2009). Most of the remaining watersheds are being used to capacity (MuñozPiña et al. 2008). The problem of water scarcity has been largely addressed through
technology and engineering with little emphasis on the management of demand or
environmental management (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008).
One of the largest concerns now in managing natural resources is how they will
respond to climate change. In Latin America climate change will be especially damaging
as it is expected to result in biodiversity loss, changes in water availability and losses of
crop productivity which will have very damaging effects on the human populations
(IPCC 2007).

Any industry that is dependent on water will be compromised. Rainfall

patterns will change which will cause a decline in aquifer recharge. Needs from human
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consumption will compete with other demands such as the generation of hydroelectric
power. Agriculture will be altered by droughts, desertification and erosion (Mendoza et
al. 2005). Models have shown that the reduction in rainfall from climate change teamed
with the ever growing population of Mexico will cause a shortage of water in many areas
requiring costly methods of distribution which may not be effective since, as the water
table lowers there is a high probability of water contamination (Mendoza et al. 2005).
Thirty percent of Mexico’s land is covered by forests which encompass 64 million
hectares (ENACC 2007). Despite this large amount of forest cover, almost half of
Mexico’s forests have been destroyed since the 1950s (Chandler et al. 2002) at a rate of
about 1.3% annually (Alix-Garcia et al. 2005). Deforestation rates in the tropical forests
are higher than in any other forest type (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). Of the 64 million
hectares currently forested, five percent is owned federally, fifteen percent is owned
privately and 60% or more forests are owned by communally or by ejidos, a traditional
form of Mexican land tenure (ENACC 2007). From 1990-2000, 348 thousand hectares
of forest were lost and from 2000-2005 the number was 260 thousand hectares annually
(ENACC 2007) putting Mexico’s deforestation rates near the top in the world (Corbera et
al. 2009). Fortunately, though deforestation rates are still high, they seem to be reducing.

Pagos por Servicios Ambientales Hidrologicos (PSAH)
Mexico has one of the largest PES programs in the world. The services covered
by the programs are water, biodiversity and agroforestry (Figure 3). Previous attempts to
reduce deforestation in Mexico include direct regulation, such as logging bans, subsidies
to sustainable forestry and police action (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). These policies were
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largely unsuccessful in stopping deforestation. One management practice that has been
found effective in stopping deforestation is community forestry (Ellis and Porter-Bolland
2008, Bray et al. 2008). In comparisons of similar communities where one was within
the boundaries of and subject to the restrictions of a protected area and another that
managed the forests communally, the community management scenario was more
successful in reducing deforestation (Ellis and Porter-Bolland 2008). Another study
found that communities that have been inhabited for a long period of time and practice
management for timber can be as effective as uninhabited protected areas in providing
long term forest protection (Bray et al. 2008). As an attempt to address Mexico’s two
largest environmental issues, the government instituted a program for the payments of
hydrological services provided by forests in 2003 (PSAH, pagos de servicios ambientales
hidrologicos).
The PSAH is run through the national forestry commission (CONAFOR, Comision
Nacional Forestal).

The purpose of this program was to give economic incentives to

land owners not to deforest in areas that were both of hydrologic importance and under
pressure from deforestation (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). The PSAH is paid to participating
land owners directly through the government which receives the money from funds
earmarked out of the fees collected by water users and aid from the World Bank and the
Government of Japan. The money is collected from users all through the country and
then redistributed to the programs supported under the PSAH (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008,
Alix-Garcia et al. 2009).

Because of this aspect, the PSAH does not meet the

qualification of a direct relationship between buyer and seller that Wunder (2005)
requires for PES, but it is not unusual for a PES program to include an intermediary
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(Pascual et al. 2009). It would have been difficult to make the PSAH a purely market
based initiative because of the fact that the benefits provided are almost entirely public
goods and since there were already fees on the use of Mexico’s rivers, lakes and aquifers,
it took little start up cost to initiate the program using that funding (Muñoz-Piña et al..
2008). Though direct market connection between individual users and providers will be
difficult, there has been some talk of forming a connection between a large corporation,
for example the Grupo Modelo breweries, and land owners for the payment for water
services. Although CONAFOR’s initial intention was to turn the program over to local
entities after the first five year contract period, in 2008 all the contracts were renewed
without further attempts to make them market based direct payments (Muñoz-Piña et al..
2008, Alix-Garcia et al. 2009).
People in Mexico, as is common in Latin America and many other places in the
world, have a strongly held perception that forests and water are deeply connected. This
perception allows a program that preserves forest for the purpose of improving water to
be an easy sell to the public (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). However, the PSAH clearly is
utilizing the precautionary principle as the actual link between forests and water is
scientifically shaky (Brauman et al. 2007, Calder 2005).
The complexities of most PES schemes make the much used Coasian basis for
PES unreachable (Muradian et al. 2009). One major barrier to the use of the Coase
Theorem is the uncertainty in the connection between land use and water provisions.
Services provided by watersheds include quantity, quality, location and timing of water
delivery (Brauman et al. 2007) as well as providing habitat for animals, supporting
biodiversity, mitigation of climate change through carbon sequestration, control of
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erosion and sedimentation as well as aesthetic and recreational benefits (Postel and
Thompson 2005). The ecosystem type or land use, particularly the associated vegetation,
within a watershed is the major determinant of the quantity, quality, location and
predictability of water moving through a watershed (Hoff 2009, Brauman et al. 2007).
Forests are usually of particular interest in watersheds. Forests are thought to
result in watersheds that effectively moderate runoff and purify water supplies (Postel
and Thompson 2005). Deforestation is held responsible for interrupting these services.
However, the real connection between forests and water is not completely cut and dry.
There is little evidence that forests increase rainfall and, if they do, the increase is likely
small (Calder 2005).

Forests may reduce runoff by holding the water within the

vegetation (Calder 2005). Although in some cases forested watersheds increase dry
season flows, most examples show a reduction in dry season flows. Infiltration is greater
in forested watersheds than non-forested watersheds only when the non-forested land is
highly degraded by activities such as agriculture or grazing associated with deforestation,
but not by the lack of trees itself (Calder 2005).
The doubts in the connection between land use and water services makes paying
for specific land cover types in order to improve hydrology questionable and the use of
Coase Theorem logic to develop a payment scheme for hydrologic protection infeasible.
Often, the connection is made on the basis of cultural beliefs on the connection between
forests and water rather than actual science. In Central America, after the devastation
caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, watershed management became a focus of policy
(Kaimowitz 2004). Watershed management policies have favored forests. Even the
small amount of evidence that existed of forests increasing rainfall was enough to
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encourage policy makers in Central America to institute forest protection policies for
watershed protection (Kaimowitz 2004).

However, the policies do not ensure that

farmers sustain the activities nor are most project areas large enough to have meaningful
impacts on the landscape level and off-site impacts are rarely measured to begin with.
Most of the benefits of such programs are assumed as a result of the belief in forest and
water relationships. However, the benefits of such activities on long term ecological
balances; climate and water flows are most likely substantial enough to support such
policies on the basis of the precautionary principle (Kaimowitz 2004). In fact, the
precautionary principle is a strong basis for hydrological PES programs in that it is better
to protect forests on the basis of limited evidence than not to protect them at all. Forest
protection offers a low risk option for solving problems of water quality, water flows and
sedimentation (Kaimowitz 2004). As the author writes:
“A good basic principle is that if the current land use provides the
quantity and quality of water the population demands with an acceptable
intra and inter annual distribution, any alteration will increase the risk of
that situation changing. This is a strong argument for maintaining natural
forest cover in many contexts.” (Kaimowitz 2004)
Tropical Montane Cloud Forests (TMCFs) have varying definitions but generally can
be defined as forests that are often covered by clouds or mist (Bruijnzeel 1999). These
are often distinguished by elevation, but many factors including temperature and
humidity affect cloud formation making it impossible to give an exact elevation where all
cloud forests are found (Bruijnzeel 1999). Unlike other types of forest, TMCFs actually
increase water infiltration and thus water availability because they collect water from the
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atmosphere that would have otherwise remained as water vapor, allowing it to reach the
soil by dripping from the vegetation. This collection of water from the atmosphere is the
major distinguishing factor between TMCFs and other tropical montane forest types
(Bruijnzeel 2004, Calder 2005). The amount of water gained this way is equal to 5-20%
of rainfall and may lead to the increase of rainfall in the dry season (Bruijnzeel 2004)
although the effect is difficult to quantify (Bruijnzeel 1999). The idea that TMCFs are
linked to water is strengthened because it is culturally accepted since TMCFs are visibly
wet most of the time. Watersheds under the influence of TMCFs have more stable dry
season flows than other forest types (Bruijnzeel 1999). In terms of dry season flows, the
loss of TMCFs may cause serious problems.

This forest type, however, is under

significant pressure and is being lost at a high rate. Threats include conversion of forests
to grazing, agriculture, deforestation for charcoal, loss of forest for telecommunication
towers and threats from climate change (Bruijnzeel 1999).
The importance of cloud forests in Mexico is recognized and reflected in the
pricing scheme within the PES program. For water services, there is a two-tiered scale
where an acre of cloud forest receives more than an acre of any other forest type in a 4:3
ratio (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). However, cloud forests in Mexico are located mostly in
the southern states and most of the overexploited watersheds are in the northern part of
the country, making the cloud forests of Mexico ill situated to aid these watersheds.
Since the forest type where this link is the clearest is cloud forest, under PSAH cloud
forests receive a larger payment per hectare per year than other forest types in a 4:3 ratio
(Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). The main forest types in my study area are tropical montane
cloud forest (TMCF) and tropical montane forest with some more heavily fragmented
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lowland tropical forest. Ultimately the choice to focus on forests to receive payments for
hydrologic services is because the program is run through CONAFOR (Muñoz-Piña et al.
2008).
Eligibility of sites for PSAH is location, location, location; location within the
recharge area of an overexploited aquifer or areas of water scarcity, location in the area of
influence of an area with a population greater than 5000 individuals, and location in areas
with high flood risk (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). The only regulation is that there should be
no change in land use. Compliance is monitored by satellite and by random site visits.
Because of the common property policies in Mexico, many of the participating lands are
communally owned (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). Application to the program is cheap and
easy, ensuring that marginalized communities would not be excluded because of costs of
participation (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009, Pagiola et al. 2005). The application form is only
two pages long and the only additional requirements are proof of legal ownership and, for
ejidos and comunidades, a document that gives evidence of a community vote in favor of
participation (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009 – see also rules for ProARBOL). This ease and low
cost of application eliminates another one of the barriers for participation of poor in PES
(Pagiola et al. 2005).

Results of PSAH
In the first year a total of 180,000 hectares were enrolled for five years with an
additional 169,000 ha added in 2005 with the majority of the land held communally
(Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). From 2003 to 2010, there were 2,767,000 hectares enrolled in
CONAFOR’s PES programs representing 5,289 million pesos (415.5 million US dollars)
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and 4,646 individual projects (CONAFOR 2011).

These programs benefited an

estimated 5,400 ejidos, comunidades and small land owners in Mexico (CONAFOR
2011). Starting in 2010 CONAFOR will offer differentiated payments to ecosystems for
new contracts (CONAFOR 2011).

As of 2008, the program was reporting 100%

compliance (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008) though there is some evidence that satellite images
have not picked up below canopy degradation that will lead to forest loss in the long term
(Southgate and Wunder 2009). Unfortunately the largest portion of the enrolled land has
low risk of deforestation, indicating that there were no additional benefits gained from
participation (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). As such, the program is in practice a reward for
good environmental behavior rather than a payment for an additional service provided.
McAfee and Shapiro (2010) would consider this a compensation for environmental
services rather than a payment. In a study done by Alix-Garcia et al. (2009) it was found
that of 11 communities in Oaxaca participating in PSAH, only five had deforested prior
to receiving payments and all of them had already been engaged in conservation
activities. Less than 25% of the funding for PSAH has gone to projects in areas within
overexploited aquifers, showing a lack of targeting in these areas (Muñoz-Piña et al.
2008). According to satellite images, most of the remaining forest in the country is not
located within the overexploited watersheds and cloud forest are particularly ill
positioned to be of much hydrologic value (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). Despite cloud
forests having the benefits outlined above, if the water does not drain to an area where
water is being used or to an area that is overdrawn or water scarce, then in terms of
payments for environmental services they are not as important. Prevalence of cloud
forests in the program, perhaps because of the higher price received, is larger than would
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be expected from the percentage of land they cover (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). Thus, the
higher price encourages more cloud forest owners to participate even though these are not
the forests of the most importance. Is essence, these land owners are being paid to
conserve forest rather than to provide a service, making the PSAH more of a conservation
subsidy and a poverty alleviation mechanism than a PES scheme (McAfee and Shapiro
2010).

Lessons Learned
The case study done by Alix-Garcia et al. (2009) led to the determination of
multiple lessons to be learned from the Mexican PES example.

These lessons are

political, financial and in terms of targeting. First, politically, some of the communities
studied were confused about the purpose of the PSAH.

Before PES programs are

promoted, clear objectives and criteria for participation need to be established. Second,
the choice of implementing agency is vital. As a result of the selection of CONAFOR as
the implementing agency the implementation costs of PSAH were kept low, but it also
resulted in the program only including forested land and also led to the over involvement
of commercial forests, as these were the ones that already had a relationship with
CONAFOR and may have led to the fact that 84% of the PSAH area in 2004 were in
aquifers categorized as not overexploited. The third lesson from the PSAH is that a PES
must provide sufficient incentive to change behavior. The authors suggest using an
auction process to reveal minimum payment, as Bond et al. (2009) use for determining
prices for bundled services. The payments must be enough not only to change land use in
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the project area but ideally to change behavior so that the land use is not simply moved to
a non-project land.
Within the context of community property, it is important that the objectives of
the program and the receipt of the payments are obvious not just to the community
leaders but to all individual members. Only when all members are aware of the program
will it change individual behavior (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009).

The final political lesson

suggests that the water service providers are involved more in the design and
management of the PES. Though not utilized in Mexico, the providers could give
valuable information in terms of targeting valuable land.
The first financial lesson Alix-Garcia et al. (2009) draw from the Mexican case
study is the assurance of sustainability of funding. Mexico has intentions to develop
local markets for water to create sustainable financing. However, the present design and
distribution of properties participating make it costly to develop direct markets and
unlikely that the downstream users will see a significant impact. Second, Mexico has a
fund in place to ensure long term payments to program participants of at least five years.
A different way of ensuring long term funding is by issuing payment certificates against
which recipients can borrow money from banks.

This approach is used by the

agricultural subsidy program, PROCAMPO.
In terms of targeting, choosing a service, like water, that is of importance locally
it is easier to secure funding from government and the possibility of local markets (AlixGarcia et al. 2009). The last lesson from targeting is keeping the goal of paying the
lowest price possible for the area of forest at the highest risk of being lost. As the
statistics from the first few years show, the majority of PSAH land is under low risk of
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deforestation. If payments were targeted to areas of high risk of deforestation, efficiency
would increase (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009).

The communities in this study, for example,

have forests with very low risk of deforestation.
Targeting forests in overexploited aquifers and placing emphasis on forests with
marginalized populations has not been followed by Mexican plan which is currently
promoted as a subsidy, with little effort focused on making it a locally managed market
based initiative (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009, McAfee and Shapiro 2010). The development of
local ES markets is limited by two main factors. First, the number of hectares enrolled in
the program may not be significant for downstream buyers to see a significant difference.
Second, the way the participants are dispersed it will be costly to organize a direct market
(Alix-Garcia et al. 2009).

As long as the demand for the service is strong, the

development of a direct market is possible, though it is unclear how it will be developed
(Alix-Garcia et al. 2009).

The World Bank opposed Mexico’s move away from the

market based program arguing that market based programs are more sustainable because
they do not rely on donations and are determined by the self interests of the participants.
Despite this, they support Mexico’s development of REDD (Reducing Emissions for
Deforestation and forest Degradation) schemes (McAfee and Shapiro 2010) and provide
substantial funding for the PSAH.

ANALYSIS
Mexico’s PES program does not fit Wunder’s (2005) definition of a PES exactly.
Below is outlined the five characteristics of a PES as listed by Wunder and how the
PSAH does or does not fit into the definition.
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1. A voluntary transaction: It is voluntary for providers, who apply for funds and
agree to protect the forest cover, but not beneficiaries who contribute through
mandatory user fees, thus it is not an entirely voluntary program.
2. A well defined environmental service or land use: The land use, forest cover of
over 80%, is well defined. However, what is not well defined is the provision of
the desired service, improved water quantity and quality, based on that land use.
3. The service is being bought by a buyer: The service is being bought by a single
buyer, the Mexican government. The funds are from user fees paid by Mexican
citizens - which are not voluntary- as well as money from the World Bank and the
Government of Japan.
4. From a service provider: The service providers are land owners being paid not to
deforest their property.
5. If the service provider ensured the provisioning of the stated services: Payments
are conditional on compliance which is monitored through random site visits and
satellite images.
Vatn (2009) developed three questions that should be addresses when studying a PES.
First, what is the distribution of rights and rules instituted to govern the interaction
between agents? For most of Mexico, land tenure is clear. Land has been distributed
since the Mexican Revolution to be managed communally either by ejidos, groups of
previously landless peasants, or comunidades, indigenous groups with historic land
rights.

Second, Vatn (2009) asks, how do transaction costs influence the arrangements?

Payments for the PSAH come from pre-existing user fees and international donations
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processed through a pre-existing government agency. By using a pre-existing agency as
intermediary, CONAFOR, and the pre-existing user fees as well as donations, transaction
costs are low as new infrastructure and new institutional relationships are not necessary.
Also, because of the land tenure system in Mexico, a large portion of the land in the
program is owned communally. Paying a single entity, such as a community Assembly,
for a large area of land rather than individuals with small parcels also reduces costs.
Payments are distributed down to individual community members by the community
leadership.
In the context of communal property it is interesting to understand how the
payments are used within the communities. In case studies conducted by Alix-Garcia et
al. (2009) the use of the funds by ejidos ranged from a pure distribution among members
to a total investment into public goods. Public goods might include materials needed for
conservation activities, infrastructure projects or school building.

The reasons

communities might choose to distribute funds this way are various. First, the amount per
member might be insignificant and better used elsewhere where the return would be
higher.

Second, public goods can be utilized and enjoyed by everyone, even non

members. Lastly, the investment in public goods may better fit societal ideas of fairness
in a way that cash payments would be unable to accomplish.
Transaction costs are low for the participants who do not need to engage in any
additional activities to participate. Since the goal of the PSAH the goal is to conserve
existing forests not to reforest, the cost of meeting program regulations is low. For
programs, such as Mexico’s previous carbon sequestration program, costs come in the
form of labor and resources needed for reforestation or afforestation projects. The third
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question asked by Vatn (2009) is, what are the motivations included in the system and
how this influences the outcome? As seen by the results, a large portion of the enrolled
land had low risk of deforestation. The motivation to comply in this or any PES system
is payment received, but in the case of Mexico there seems to be low additionality,
indicating that motivation of receiving money is unnecessary to achieve the desired land
use. In terms of PSAH, additionality would be the forests protected under the PSAH that
would otherwise have been deforested. In many of Mexico’s community forests, there is
already sustainable management and strict regulation on forest uses. In the case studies
done by Alix-Garcia et al. (2009) all of the ejidos studied were practicing some form of
forest conservation before the implementation of the PSAH.
Payments for environmental services programs are well suited for Mexico where
land tenure is secure and communities have full decision making capabilities. However,
Pagiola (2007) suggest that direct user to provider programs are the most likely to
succeed. Mexico’s program is not direct user to buyer but is a publicly funded incentives
program. For voluntary payments there must be a clear connection between the payments
and the services provided with some certainty and trust that the services will continue.
This is not done in Mexico where the payments are not voluntary and there is also not a
direct connection between payers and providers, by nature eliminating the ability of water
users to discontinue payments if they are dissatisfied with the results of the protection as
the fees are compulsory and much of the program funding is from foreign sources, not the
water users. There is no direct linkage between those who pay the user fees and the
programs being funded, as the money is centralized and redistributed as the government
sees appropriate. These compulsory user fees in Mexico’s system eliminated the problem
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of free riders. In summary, the PSAH is a type of environmental subsidy which, while
internalizing costs, may have the problem of additionality and leakage.

OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the study are as follow:
(1) To determine the political and institutional processes that governed decisionmaking on the participation in the PSAH program.
(2) To determine household impact and poverty alleviation potential of the payments.
(3) To determine how participation in PSAH has aided in building social capital and
increased potential for collective action within the study communities and
between them and other communities
(4) To determine if community members are satisfied with the structure of the
program or if there is a more socially optimal way to distribute payments.
(5) To estimate community member’s willingness to accept (WTA) for additional
conservation projects, specifically carbon sequestration, under various conditions
of property rights and opportunity costs for hydrological purposes.
As shown through various case studies presented in this chapter, there is a vast body
of work on PES. My study will contribute to the literature by providing a case study of a
PES program functioning within a common property regime, something hitherto
unexplored. This common property regime addresses issues of poor participation, equity
and compliance with PES regulations in a way unique from programs that pay individual
land owners.
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
Chapter I of the thesis has laid out the concept of Payments for Environmental
Services, particularly payments for hydrologic services. I then described the PSAH
program in Mexico and placed my study in the context of the existing literature on PES
programs.
In Chapter II I will describe my two study sites and the methods used in the study.
I will describe the surveys and interviews used. Finally I will explain my analysis.
Chapter III will provide an overview of the results of the surveys and interviews. In
Chapter IV I will give the results of the willingness to accept for carbon payments
questionnaire. The final chapter, Chapter V, will give our conclusions and fit our study
into a broader realm of studies of PES.
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CHAPTER II – STUDY SITES AND RESEARCH METHODS

STUDY SITES
The two study communities for this project, Santa Cruz Tepetotutla and San
Pedro Tlatepusco (here after, Santa Cruz and San Pedro), are located in an area of
northern Oaxaca known as the Chinantla Alta.

The Chinantla Alta is part of the Sierra

Juarez mountain range just north of the area known as the Sierra Norte within the
Papaloapan watershed.
Mexico is one of the world’s most biodiverse countries and the state of Oaxaca is
valuable for conservation because of its high biodiversity, species richness, and high rates
of endemism (Oviedo 2002).

There are few federally protected areas in Oaxaca.

Community-level conservation is very important in Oaxaca not only because there are
few federally protected areas but also because by the highest estimates up to 80% of land
Figure 2.1: Map of Mexico showing proposed locations for conservation areas. The
circled area is the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca, the location of the two study sites. The map
is adapted from Brandon et al. (2005).

Sierra Norte
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in Oaxaca is owned by comunidades or ejidos (Oviedo 2002). Mexico itself has an
extensive system of protected areas but there are still large areas of forest without federal
protection and with high levels of deforestation. In an attempt to maximize conservation
benefits of protected areas and minimize conflicts with agricultural productivity, Brandon
et al. (2005) used spatial data for mammals, birds and amphibians overlaid with areas of
human habitation.

They determined areas suitable for conservation that would be

sufficient enough to protect all unprotected Mexican species of mammal, bird and
amphibian without causing major conflict with human populations.

From this

information they proposed areas where new reserves should be placed (Figure 2.1). One
large block suggested by the authors is located in the Sierra Norte Region of Oaxaca.
Although Oaxaca has very little area covered by federal protected areas, 93,121.03
hectares in the state are protected by what are called “Areas de Conservacion
Certificadas” (Ortega de Valle et al. 2010) or, as we will refer to them,
Indigenous/Community Conserved Areas or for brevity, community conserved areas
(CCAs), a term used by the IUCN (Borrini-Feyerbend et al. 2004). Under a 2008
modification to the Mexican environmental law, CCAs in Mexico are formally
considered part of the Mexican national protected areas systems, such as biosphere
reserves and national parks except that the management is shared between the federal
government, state and local governments or locally (CONANP 2009). The region that
Brandon et al. (2005) suggest in the Sierra Norte is not protected by a formal protected
area but owned by Zapotec and Chinantec communities and large areas are informally
conserved and increasing areas are certified as CCAs.
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Federal protected areas have been considered Mexico’s primary means of
protecting biodiversity (Garcia-Frapolli et al. 2009), but CCAs are also appropriate to
protect forests, in fact, approximately 95% of land in protected areas in Mexico is not
owned federally but by ejidos (Garcia-Frapolli et al. 2009).

The IUCN defines

community conserved areas as “natural and modified ecosystems with significant
biodiversity, ecological and related cultural values, voluntarily conserved by indigenous
peoples and local communities through customary laws or other effective means”
(Kothari 2006). Over half of Mexico’s forests are owned by comunidades or ejidos.
These communities have been shown to provide ecologically sustainable economic
opportunities as well as ecological protection when managing the forests for logging
(Bray et al. 2003). Similar results might be expected for forests which are conserved
rather than logged.
Rural land reform in Mexico left rural communities with legal tenure over their
lands in the form of ejidos and comunidades. The local authority and political structure
of the ejidos and comunidades is recognized under Mexican law. For most communities
the highest authority is the Community Assembly which is formed by all legal
community members (Oviedo 2002). Local communities have been generally distrustful
of federal protected areas which are seen as a weakening in their rights to their land and
have instead elected to manage their natural resources within their own local governance
(Oviedo 2002, personal communication with Geoconservación workshop and others).
Previous to the certification of CCAs in the state of Oaxaca, a study done by WWF on
community conservation in the state found that conservation implemented at the
community level was long term, had clear and accountable administration and decision
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making, managed to maintain a link with economic activities, and were able to protect the
structure and function of ecosystems in a manner that was more integrated than is typical
with federal protected areas, and that all of this was achieved at a low cost (Oviedo
2002).

The successful community conservation initiatives studied showed similar

conditions including well defined territories, strong community governance that allowed
for actions to be taken with the confidence and support of the population, a basic
understanding of biodiversity as a resource that provides tangible benefits to the people in
a collective manner, a recognition of both collective rights and collective responsibilities
to the resource and an approach to conservation planning that creates links to a broader
landscape rather than seeing the conserved area as isolated (Oviedo 2002).
In the state of Oaxaca in total 69,455 hectares or 75% of the land protected by
CCAs is owned by indigenous communities (Ortega del Valle et al. 2010).

The

Papaloapan region of Oaxaca has sixteen CCAs which cover an area of 32,935.63
hectares (Ortega del Valle et al. 2010). The Papaloapan region covers 867,815 hectares
and 59% is under some type of conservation. Ecosystems present are dominated by
humid tropical forest, cloud forests and temperate forests (Ortega del Valle et al. 2010). .
The CCAs of our study sites; Area de conservacion la Tierra del Faisan of Santa Cruz
and Area de Conservacion San Pedro Tlatepusco of San Pedro were both declared in
2004 (CONANP 2009). Both Santa Cruz Tepetotutla and San Pedro Tlatepusco are
comunidades and are 96% and 100% ethnically Chinantec respectively (Ortega del Valle
et al. 2010).
Of the different ethnic groups that exist in the state of Oaxaca, the Chinantecs
have 14 of the 74 CCAs (Ortega del Valle et al. 2010).
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The Chinantecos have a long

history of conservation in their forests. This was documented as early as the 1930s by the
ethnographer Bernard Bevan.
“Nowhere have the Chinantec effected a permanent transformation of the
forest, and the Chinantla retains its true climax vegetation to a degree perhaps
unequalled elsewhere in Mexico. Such is the habitat of the Chinantec – a
luxurious dripping forest, and where this forest comes to an end, there also
ends their territory. So abrupt and striking is the transition that one finds
along the very Chinantec border that the great hills present two different
slopes: the one arid and treeless, or clad with a few oaks; the other moist and
covered with dense tropical forest. The latter slope is Chinantec; the former
belongs to another tribe”
(Bevan, 1938: p. 11)

Comité Regional de Recursos Naturales de la Chinantla Alta (CORENCHI)

“Our ancestors showed us the value of community conservation. In
our community, the work of natural resource conservation passes from
generation to generation. The forest is considered for us, 'home of Jaguar’
from which comes the bird song and all classes of animal; taking care of the
habitat of the curassow, brocket, Jaguar, armadillo and redfish is taking care
of our territory”
CORENCHI (as quoted in CONAFOR 2011: p.2)
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The two study communities are part of a community organization called the
Regional Committee of Natural Resources of the Chinantla Alta (Comité Regional de
Recursos naturales de la Chinantla Alta), known locally as CORENCHI.

The six

communities that make up CORENCHI are Santa Cruz Tepetotutla, San Antonio del
Barrio, San Pedro Tlatepusco Santiago Tlatepusco, San Antonio Analco and Nopalera del
Rosario with a seventh, Vega del Sol, geographically separated from the others, recently
gaining membership. Originally there were four communities, Santa Cruz, Santiago, San
Pedro and San Antonio. Analco and Nopalera entered into CORENCHI later in order to
take advantage of the PSAH after they saw that the program was successful in the
original four communities. The six current CORENCHI communities contain 26,770 Ha
of certified community conserved areas (Ortega del Valle et al. 2010). Formed in 2005,
CORENCHI creates a joint strategy by which the member communities manage their
natural resources and lobby government agencies for support in order to improve the
socioeconomic situation in the communities. Together they have managed not only to
declare the community conserved areas but also to take advantage of the government
payments for environmental services program. The communities of CORENCHI, since
their initiation into the PSAH through 2010, have received over 45 million pesos and
conserves a total of 22,103 hectares (CONAFOR 2011).
The communities work closely with several government and nongovernmental
organizations, including Oaxaca based NGO’s, CAMPO and Geoconservación, in order
to take advantage of different programs and solicit various types of aid. For example,
through the NGO, CAMPO, Italian architectural students have come to three of the
communities to build community houses that are used to host visiting researchers, NGO
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and government workers as well as visitors from other communities. Grupo Modelo, a
large brewery in Mexico, has giving assistance to three CORENCHI communities in the
form of an ecotourism lodge, trail signs and a small hydroelectric plant.

In 2006, one

year after its formation, SEMARNAT awarded CORENCHI an honorable mention for
the Merito Ecological (ecological merit) award and CORENCHI was also nominated for
the 2008 Equator Prize (equatorinitiative.org).

Santa Cruz Tepetotutla
A study published in 2000 shows that land distributed as shown in table 2.1.
Though some of the numbers may have changed a bit, the land is distributed in mostly
the same way at the time of the study (ERA 2000).
The Chinanteco name for Santa Cruz Tepetotutla means “land of the birds” or
“home of the curassow” (ERA 2000). Until 2003 there was no road in or out of Santa
Cruz and all travel had to be done by foot or with pack animal. At the end of the 1990s,
the population of the town decreased as a result of a large amount of emigration from the
community when the prices of coffee fell (ERA 2000) and currently the community has
around 700 inhabitants with approximately 121 legal members recognized by the
Assembly. Before the drop in coffee prices, coffee was a main source of income for the
community where now a major source of income is reportedly remittances sent by those
who emigrated (ERA 2000). In 2000, of the 150 people who had immigrated from the
community due to the drop in coffee prices, seventy were in Oaxaca City, fifty were in
Mexico City and thirty were in Los Angeles in the United States (ERA 2000).
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Table 2.1: Distribution of land use in Santa Cruz.
%

Land Use

6.6

Rest phase of corn rotation

5

Forest dominated by Pinus chapensis

62

Montane tropical forest and cloud forest

8.5

Oak forest

3.6

Coffee fields

7.5

Agricultural land

2.1

Pasture

2.3

Secondary forest

1.8

Selva mediana perennifolia

0.5

Urban area
Total area: 11,2454.78

The certified CCA has been made possible not only by a long history of a culture
of conservation as documented by Bevan (1938), but also by the concentration of
agricultural practices. In the community, of the total 11,245.78 hectares (or up to 12,372
ha as cited by the NGO Geoconservacion) only a little more than 20% is taken up by
some sort of agricultural activity or by urban areas (ERA 2000, personal communication
with Geoconservacion). The concentration of agricultural practices was made possible
through a history of intra-community struggles over land use, but where conservationoriented leaders became increasingly dominant by the mid-2000s. With the instability in
coffee prices and ensuing emigration, conservation was seen by some community leaders
as a way to generate income in order to keep young people in the community. The
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community members are limited to three areas for pasture for animals and these areas can
only be used with permission by a person who has completed all of their requirements as
comuneros (ERA 2000, Don Pedro Osorio Hernandez, personal communication). Slash
and burn agriculture is practiced with a minimum of four years fallow. The land in the
fallow phase reverts back to the community so that an area of land only pertains to an
individual if they are actively working in it. People in the community generally respect
areas that people have historically worked or where an individual cleared the forest. Also,
projects such as the greenhouses promoted by CAMPO and the practice of policulture,
growing crops such as corn, beans and coffee along with oranges, plantains, pacaya palm
(tepejilote), and other indigenous foods, have allowed their food production to be
intensified thus maximizing production on a limited area (Don Pedro Osorio Hernandez
and Don Raymundo Osorio Garcia, personal communication). Agricultural abandonment
from emigration may also be leading to a growth in secondary forest and increasing
biodiversity (Masters thesis in progress of Ernesto de los Santos n.d., and Hite 2011).
The zoning of agricultural activities and the forested areas is by community mandate and
emerged from a land use zoning exercise (ordenamiento territorial comunitario) carried
out in 2000 and approved by the community Assembly in 2003, and was in existence
before the certification of the CCA (ERA 2000).

San Pedro Tlatepusco
San Pedro Tlatepusco was originally founded more than five hundred years ago.
The territory of the community is 6,289 hectares. The Santiago River passes through the
middle of town with residents living on both sides connected by a hanging bridge
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constructed in 1987. In 1928 the river flooded, destroying the entire community. The
heavy rains at this time also caused landslides in the mountains around the town. Those
who survived the flood returned to reestablish the community but the areas that were
destroyed by the landslides never recovered their forests but were invaded by bracken
fern (personal communication with Don Felipe Martinez Ortiz). To this date, these areas
remain deforested and uncultivated. Bracken fern is a highly productive plant which is
able to become dominant in disturbed habitats (Marrs et al. 2000). Bracken fern is not
easily controlled and complete, labor intensive ecological restoration is required to
eradicate or control it (Marrs et al. 2000). Because of the bracken fern, the agricultural
zone is not close to the urban zone and many people walk more than an hour to get to
their parcels.
As of 2003, the population of San Pedro was 278 people in 50 households. As in
Santa Cruz, the people of San Pedro are ethnically Chananteco and speak both Spanish
and Chinanteco, the indigenous language. Around 26% of the population over the age of
15 is illiterate. There is no road into the community and to reach the nearest road in the
municipal center of San Felipe Usila is a four hour walk, depending on the pace. There is
a radio in the community with which they can communicate to Usila and other
CORENCHI communities, but there is no phone. There is a preschool and an elementary
school as well as a health center without a permanent nurse.
The name Tlatepusco comes from the Nahuatl language and means “place behind
the land.” Though some of the homes are built in the traditional style with walls made of
poles and thatched roofs, the majority of the homes are cement with tin roofs (see figure
3.9). There is a catholic church, several evangelical churches, a community center, a
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community house built by Italian engineering students and a community museum
(Escalante y Ramero, n.d.).
In terms of agriculture, corn and beans are grown mostly for consumption. Other
products that are grown are cacao, yucca, tepejilote (pacaya palm), guasmol, vanilla,
sugar cane, and fruits such as oranges, bananas and mango. These are sometimes sold
but most are grown for household consumption. Most families have coffee fields and
many sell coffee for income. There have also been projects in the community for the
production of honey, tilapia and vegetables (Escalante y Ramero, n.d.).

Community Governance
Both communities are members of CORENCHI and have the same local
governance structure (Figure 2.2). The structure includes the Assembly the comisariado,
and the oversight committee (consejo de vigilancia) as is dictated by Mexican agrarian
law. Leadership roles last for three years, rotate, and are mandatory. The main decision
making body is called the Assembly and is constructed of all legally recognized
community members.

This basic structure is required by Mexican agrarian law, but the

requirements say only that the groups meet twice a year.

In the CORENCHI

communities meetings of the Assembly are monthly or more frequently. Participation in
CORENCHI is not required by law. That the communities go above and beyond what is
required by law is evidence of high levels of collective action within and between
communities. From the Assembly, three delegates to CORENCHI are selected and those
delegates join with delegates from other communities. The leadership is made up of two
main bodies, the Comisariado of Bienes Comunales (common property), hereafter
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Figure 2.2: Community governance structure in San Pedro Tlatepusco and Santa Cruz
Tepetotutla.

CORENCHI

other
communities

Delegates to
CORENCHI (3)

Assembly

Comisariado de
Bienes Comunales

Consejo de
Vigilancia

Committees

President (+
suppliment)

President (+
suppliment)

Technicians

Secretary (+
suppliment)

Secretary (+
suppliment)

Schools

Treasurer(+
suppliment)

Treasurer(+
suppliment)

Ecotourism

Ect. . .

referred to as the comisariado, and the Consejo de vigilancia (oversight council)
hereafter referred to as the consejo. In addition to these roles, community members are
selected to form a variety of other committees to accomplish tasks of the community.
These committees include technicians to work in conservation with a variety of agencies
and organizations, committees for the schools, ecotourism including cooks and guides,
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individuals to be in charge of transportation, the community store and other needs of the
community.

RESEARCH METHODS
Data Collection
The study took place during the summer of 2010 (May 16th to July 27th, including
a two week field course and orientation). In the two study communities, Santa Cruz
Tepetotutla and San Pedro Tlatepusco, I conducted structured household surveys, semistructured interviews with community leaders and informal interviews with some key
informants. In Santa Cruz my key informants were Don Pedro Osorio Hernandez and
Don Raimundo Osorio Garcia. The key informants in San Pedro Tlatepusco were Don
Felipe Martinez Osorio and Don Fulgencio Manuel Felipe.
Informal interviews were conducted in both study sites following the guidelines
of Bernard (2002). Informal interviews were conducted at various points throughout the
investigation. The first interviews were during the finalization and pre-testing phase of
the structured surveys. Through informal interviews we determined the structure of the
payment for hydrologic services (PSAH) distributions, the history of how the distribution
was decided upon and the format for which requests to use the funds are made.
Documents were obtained from the office of bienes comunales including official amounts
of money received, the number of scholarships given, the number of requests for money
and the amount given, and also how much money each individual community member
has received. Information was also obtained from attending a workshop in Santa Cruz on
June 30th in which the key actors from Santa Cruz and CORENCHI shared information to
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an ejido from the state of Chiapas about how CORENCHI communities initiated their
conservation areas, CORENCHI, PES, and the fondo concurrente, an idea which will be
described in detail later. Informal interviews were also used to determine how the
community decided to enter into the PSAH, how the distribution of the funds was
decided and other general background information. Informal interviews were recorded
when possible and typically there was no guide and no translator present.
The semi-structured surveys were developed and executed following the
guidelines of Bernard (2002). The surveys ask questions of present and past community
leaders about the actions taken to participate in the PSAH and how the community has
benefited or changed from participation. Semi-structured surveys were conducted at the
end of the data collection period in Santa Cruz and before beginning structured surveys in
San Pedro. This was done because of timing and coordination issues with other students.
The semi-structured survey for this study was combined with the semi-structured survey
of another study entitled “Analysis of governance institutions for collective action of
biodiversity conservation in six Chinantec communities in Oaxaca, Mexico” being
conducted by Oscar Antonio Molina Gonzalez for a Master’s thesis in progress at CIDIR
Oaxaca.

After obtaining a list of the community authorities since 1997 until now,

individuals were selected from Santa Cruz and from San Pedro. These sample sizes were
based on the idea that there are three year cycles of leadership, meaning that between
1997 and 2010 there have been 5 cycles of leadership. Semi-structured surveys were
recorded when possible and were attended by a guide who was able to explain questions
and translate between Spanish and Chinanteco when necessary.
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Structured surveys were conducted in both Santa Cruz and San Pedro. The
surveys were created following the guidelines of Nardi (2003), Bernard (2002) and
utilizing some questions taken from a survey by David Runsten and Jessa Lewis on
coffee and emigration in Oaxaca (the results of which are presented in Lewis and Runsten
2005).

In Santa Cruz there are 121 listed comuneros and 58 surveys completed,

representing 48% of comuneros. San Pedro has 69 listed comuneros, 28 surveys were
completed representing 41% of comuneros. Mexican agrarian communities have a formal
list (padron) of legal community members who constitute the Assembly and this was
used to determine the sample rather than houses as it is rare that a household would not
include a listed comunero and I was only interested in those who receive payments from
the PSAH program. A random numbers chart was generated using Microsoft Excel and
used to select comuneros from the list to survey. Some houses contain more than one
listed comunero in the case that a child over 19 is living with his parents, an elderly
parent is living with an adult child or that siblings may reside in the same house. This
was more common in San Pedro than Santa Cruz. In San Pedro approximately 75% of
the households were captured while in Santa Cruz the number was likely closer to fifty
percent. In the case that multiple comuneros live together in the same house only one
survey was completed by the individual with the most knowledge of the household
income or, when possible, with all the comuneros in the house present so as not to sample
the same household income more than once.

The survey asked questions about

household income including remittances received, agricultural production, and payments
from government programs (see appendix I). Few individuals in either community sell
corn and so corn production was not assessed. If any corn was sold it would fall under
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“other cultivated products that you sell.”

Income was estimated to establish what

percentage of the income is from the payments for hydrologic services. Income was
difficult to determine because no one receives a set salary and few individuals keep track
of annual income. I determined income through a series of questions asking for incomes
from various agricultural products, government programs, and common income
generating activities in which the members of the household may be involved. Responses
to income questions may have been intentionally lower than actual incomes as there is
concern within the community that some of the government aid programs, such as
OPPORTUNIDADES which is paid to mothers of children in school, may be taken away
if the government determines their incomes to be high enough not to need assistance.
Questions were asked in the structured survey about coffee production, the
number of hectares of coffee plots owned and of those how much has been abandoned.
This section included other uses of the land and other crops produced along with coffee.
These questions will be used in a separate study by Hite (2011).

Information about

coffee production will be utilized in the current study to establish the opportunity cost of
conservation in coffee areas. The coffee plots are the only agricultural lands that are
considered as private property within the framework of communal ownership.

Other

agricultural land used for corn fields is communal. Corn fields have a rotation of five
years. Every year a community member can select where and how much land they
convert to corn, but it must be within the agricultural zone and have had at least four
years of rest since it was last in production. Even though the same individual will often
plant corn in the same location every rotation, the land is technically communal and
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cannot be permanently claimed or altered to other uses by an individual the way the
coffee fields are claimed.
The structured survey includes a section that asks about the payments for
hydrological services which includes perception questions about conservation in general
and also the distribution, use and quantity of the payments. I also asked about the amount
of money each person had received from the payments. We found that this was difficult
to obtain as the subjects either could not remember or were unwilling to say. The
previous president of the comisariado in Santa Cruz had stolen money from the
community, though not PSAH money.

Because of this some trust was lost and

community members felt insecure about their fund that was in the bank. Because of this
insecurity, it was reported that all the money in the bank for Santa Cruz was taken out
and each community member was given their share. A date that this transaction occurred
was not obtained because of disagreement among the community members but is
generally agreed to have happened after the 2009 funds had been disbursed in December
2008 but before the disbursement of the 2010 funds in December of 2009. The amount
received was equal for everyone unless they had previously taken money from their
account. Since this information is most likely inaccurate on the surveys, the quantity
received by each individual was obtained from disbursement record in the office of
bienes comunales. The date on which this distribution occurred could not be agreed upon
by the informants in Santa Cruz. For this reason we did not use the income from the total
distribution in determining household income for the year and in the data analysis. Also,
this distribution happened only once and represents a large departure from their typical
annual income.
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The final section of the structured survey is intending to capture willingness to
accept in a carbon payment project. Following Southgate et al. (2009), I first explained
that forests are important not only for their ability to conserve water but also for the
capture of carbon, which is a contaminant causing climate change. It is explained that
governments and companies create projects of conservation or reforestation for the
purpose of creating carbon credits that can be sold in the market. The subject was then
asked if they would be willing to participate in a program where the community would be
paid either to continue conserving or to plant trees for the sake of capturing carbon. If the
subject responded negatively, the survey ended, but those who replied in the affirmative
were asked four following questions. Half of the participants were told the market price
of carbon which at the time of the study was $0.10 according to the Chicago Climate
Exchange (CCX, www.chicagoclimatex.com) and told that their forests would be able to
generate 200 carbon credits per hectare, a figure based on a meta-analysis of biome level
carbon stocks by Gibbs et al. (2007). Since the exchange rate at the time of the study was
roughly 11 pesos to the dollar subjects were given the round figure of 200 pesos per
hectare. The remaining half of the participants were not given this figure. The following
questions asked first about a payment for conservation and payment for reforestation.
First, subjects were asked to give an amount per hectare per year that should be paid for
carbon sequestration within the certified Community Conserved Area (CCA).

This

question was asked with the context of their currently receiving payments for 4,000
hectares while 5,000 hectares remain without payments in the case of Santa Cruz. In San
Pedro 3,000 hectares receive payments and they have 1,300 hectares without payment in
their CCA. When a response was received for how much should be paid, the subject was
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asked what was the least they would be willing to accept. Of the 82 subjects who were
asked this question, 79 eventually gave a response. In most cases, the response was
difficult to obtain because subjects were reluctant to give an opinion on something they
thought should be a community decision. Interviewers explained that the responses
would be confidential. Subjects were asked to give the response that they would suggest
to the Assembly if this topic were being discussed or the amount that they would vote for
in the Assembly if it came to a vote.
The next set of questions asked the subject what should be paid per hectare per
year to plant trees. During the pre-test we discovered that the corn fields are communal
and thus respondents were unwilling to give an amount due to the fact that it is something
that would have to be determined by the Assembly and it would be unlikely that the
Assembly would decide to remove land from the agricultural zone for conservation
because so much territory is already under conservation, and corn fields have to be held
fallow for at least four years. Because of this we asked the question in terms of how
much they would be willing to accept to give up their coffee fields for conservation.
Since the coffee plots considered as though they were private property, individual
subjects were able to give a response. We specified that they would have to be forest
trees and not fruit trees.
In San Pedro we also added a question about willingness to accept to plant trees
where there is currently only bracken fern. This was added because here is an area that is
neither forest nor agricultural land. Santa Cruz did not have an area which was not either
agriculture or forest. Also, in the first few interviews we saw that the people in San
Pedro were generally unwilling to consider giving up their agricultural lands. This is
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most likely due to the fact that so much of their land, an estimated one third, is unusable
because of the bracken fern and they already have to walk long distances to get to their
fields.
We had several difficulties in obtaining survey results.
household incomes are difficult to capture for many reasons.

For example, the
First, many income

generating activities are intermittent and people are unsure about how much they make
for particular activities. Also, the subjects do not keep track of costs and income from
regular activities such as stores or the sale of bread. We are also told by our guides that
the subjects are unwilling to give accurate answers because they are afraid that they will
lose some of their government assistance if it seems as though they have too much
money. Even though we informed them that we were not from the government and that
all the information that we received is confidential, the subjects did not always trust us.
The guides helped us by reminding subjects of activities that they have not mentioned or
by informing us later of information that we were not given.

The most frequent

information that was withheld was whether or not they own cattle and whether or not
they receive remittances. There is thus a margin of error in income calculations but it is
difficult to specify how large
Guides were present for all structured surveys.

Very frequently they were

required to translate questions and responses between Spanish and Chinanteco. It is not
clear how much might have been lost between translations. In Santa Cruz five guides
were used and one in San Pedro. Each guide was trained before assisting with the
surveys. The guides were told the significance of each question, what information they
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were allowed to give the subject to aid them in answering the question and encouraged
not to lead the subject into any particular answer.
All monetary data were collected in Mexican pesos.

When the results are

presented they will be presented in pesos with us dollar amounts following in
parentheses. The average exchange rate for June 2010 when most of the data were
collected was 12.73 pesos to one US dollar. This is the exchange rate that will be used
through the paper.

Analysis
Structured survey data was analyzed using two different statistical packages,
SPSS and Stata 9.0. Summary statistics and most graphs were created using SPSS. The
statistical package Stata 9.0 was used to run multivariate regression analyses and to
empirically estimate household willingness to accept (WTA) for the described
conservation payment programs.

The Heckman selection model considers the factors

that influence whether or not an individual was willing to participate in the described
program and what factors influenced the amount they were willing to accept. Because
only those who were willing to participate named a price they were willing to accept, I
needed a regression that did not have a selection bias from the self-censored sample.
This is why the Heckman Selection Model was used (Heckman 1979). Other studies on
WTA have used the Heckman Selection method to eliminate selection bias (Devkota and
Paudel 2009).
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CHAPTER III – RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS AND SURVEYS

In this chapter I will present the results of the informal interviews, semi-structured
surveys and structured household surveys. The results will be organized into sections
which address the history of the Pagos por Servicios Ambientales – Hidrologicos
(PSAH), decision making and funds distribution in the community, community approval
of the program, household income effects, and the future options for the program.
Six semi-structured surveys were conducted in San Pedro and six in Santa Cruz.
Informal interviews were conducted throughout the seven week study period. All of the
twelve semi-structured surveys were conducted with male respondents. Women were not
interviewed because only men hold higher up authority positions in the communities.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of structured survey respondents
Community

No. of
interviews

Santa Cruz

59 (67%)

San Pedro

29 (33%)

Total

88 (100%)

No.
Male
47
(80%)
19
(66%)
66
(75%)

No.
Mean
Female age
12
(20%)
10
(33%)
22
(25%)

54.52
43.73
50.92

Average
income
26,979.24
(2119.34)
33,085.86
(2599.05)
29,014.78
(2279.24)

Average
number of
residents in
household
3.62
5.38
4.21

In total 88 structured surveys were conducted at the household level. Table 3.1
provides an overview of the individuals interviewed. In total, seventy-five percent of the
interviews were conducted with males. Generally, males are the heads of household.
Interviews were conducted with the women in the house only if the male head of
household were absent or unavailable. The mean age of respondents was 50.92 years, the
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Variable
CARGO
RESIDENTS
EDUCATION
GENDER
CARBMARK
EQUALDIST
USEFUND
CHILDOUT
AGREEDIST
ECONIMPROVE
COMMUNITY
CHILDREN
ELDERLY
REMITTANCE
TOTALPES
TOTALINCOME
%GOV
PAYENOUGH
COFFEEHA
WORTHRESTRI
CT
COFFEETOTAL
CROPTOTAL

Table 3.2a: Variable names and descriptions
Description
If the respondent has had a leadership position in the community
(0=no, 1=yes)
The number of individuals that live in the home of the
respondent
The highest level of education in the house (1=preschool, 2=
primary 1-3rd grade, 3=primary 4-6th grade, 4=secondary school,
5= preparatory school, 6= university, 0= did not attend)
1=male, 2=female
If the investigator explained carbon market price to the
respondent (1=yes, 2=no)
If the respondent believes the payments are distributed in an
equal manner among members (1=yes, 0=no)
If anyone in the house had requested money from the fund kept
in the bank (1=yes, 0=no)
The number of children who live outside of the community
If the respondent agrees with the way the community uses and
distributes the money received (1=yes, 0=no)
If the respondent felt that their economic situation had improved
because of the payments (1=yes, 0=no)
1= Santa Cruz, 2=San Pedro
The number of children under the age of 15 who reside in the
house of the respondent
The number of elderly over the age of 59 who reside in the house
of the respondent
If the household receives income from remittance (1=yes, 0=no)
The total amount, in pesos, the household received in PES. In
Santa Cruz, this does not include the distribution of the funds
from the bank
The total household income in pesos
The percentage of income that comes from government programs
not including PES
If the respondent believes that the 400pesos the community
receives per hectare per year from the PSAH is sufficient (1=yes,
0=no)
Total number of hectares of coffee owned by residents of the
house
If the respondent believes that the payments are worth their
restrictions on land use change (1=yes, 0=no)
Total income from coffee the previous year
Total income from non-coffee crops last year
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mean age was slightly higher in Santa Cruz than San Pedro. San Pedro reports a slightly
higher mean household income than Santa Cruz but also has a larger average household
size.
The variables used in the analyses are listed and described in Table 3.2.
Important results from these variables will be described throughout this chapter. The
following pages will describe the important finding from the household surveys, semi
structured surveys and the interviews. Table 3.2b gives summary statistics for each of the
variables described in table 3.2a. The importance of these statistics will be described through the
chapter.

PROGRAM

BEGINNINGS;

EVOLUTION

OF

COLLECTIVE

ACTION

TOWARDS CONSERVATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PSAH
The Oaxaca based NGO Geoconservación was instrumental in the participation of
the CORENCHI communities in the PSAH program as well as the decision by the
communities to declare significant parts of their territories as community conserved areas
(CCAs). The communities had not been systematically practicing “conservation” in the
modern sense before.

Nonetheless, traditional agricultural practices, emigration, the

many parts of the community territory too high in altitude for cultivation, and apparent
traditional protection of some stands of

mature pines in the agricultural areas had

resulted in large areas of relatively intact forests. Land-use zoning and issues relevant to
conservation did not become systematically addressed until the 1990s and early 2000s.
Ecologists who began to work in the region in the 1990s introduced the concepts of the
scientific value of the plants in their region and notions of modern conservation. In 2000,
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Table 3.2b: Variable names and summary statistics.
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

CARGO

0.53

.501

0

1

RESIDENTS

4.21

2.17

1

11

EDUCATION

3.29

1.24

0

6

GENDER

1.25

.44

1

2

CARBMARK

1.58

.50

1

2

EQUALDIST

.85

.36

0

1

USEFUND

.442

.50

0

1

CHILDOUT

2.8

2.85

0

10

AGREEDIST

.822

.385

0

1

ECONIMPROVE

.839

.370

0

1

COMMUNITY

1.33

.473

1

2

CHILDREN

1.25

1.69

0

7

ELDERLY

.659

.829

0

2

.379
7126.437
(559.81)
29014.78
(2279.24)
0.44

.488
6209.341
(487.77)
14450.46
(1135.15)
0.21

0

7040
(553.02)
0.05

1
32000
(2513.75)
81830
(6428.12)
1

PAYENOUGH

.213

0.411

0

1

COFFEEHA

2.28

1.41

0

8.5

0.72
2108.36
(165.62)
796.48
(62.57)

0.45
3497.87
(274.77)
2323.24
(182.50)

0

1
24000
(1885.31)
17400
(1366.85)

REMITTANCE
TOTALPES
TOTALINCOME
%GOV

WORTHRESTRICT
COFFEETOTAL
CROPTOTAL

0

0
0

an Oaxacan NGO, Estudios Rurales y Asesoria (ERA) was contracted with funds from a
Government of Mexico-World Bank forestry program to carry out a land use zoning
exercise (ordenamiento territorial comunitario) in the community (ERA 2000).
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In

Mexico, this has been a commonly used methodology as a first step towards land use
with important conservation implications.

The land-use planning resulted in three

distinct zones. The first zone is the urban zone which is a small part of the territory and
the only place that community members may reside. In Santa Cruz the urban zone makes
up only 0.5% of the total territory (ERA 2000). The second zone is the much larger
agricultural zone which contains corn fields, acahuales (corn fields in the resting phase of
rotation) and coffee fields as well as some large stands of mature pines (Pinus chiapensis)
which have been planted by community members. In San Pedro there is also a large area
of the agricultural territory which is covered by bracken fern, as mentioned previously.
High estimates indicate that as much as a third of San Pedro’s territory is covered by this
fern. The third zone is the conservation area, which is the largest area. This land use
zoning was entirely internal.
During the period of the 1980’s in Santa Cruz a community rule was passed
which required community members to request permission before cutting trees. Other
community rules called for keeping animals fenced in and keeping the paths within the
community clean.

In 2003 construction on the road leading to Santa Cruz was

completed. In 2001, when the road had reached a stand of pine, the community had
support to draw up a logging management plan, and logging was conducted for a year or
two. But the community leader at the time absconded with funds from the sale and the
community reaction was to stop all logging.

One prominent community leader on

conservation issues adamantly insists that the culture of conservation and the actions they
have taken came purely from themselves rather than from NGO or government
intervention. He argues that the original incentives to conserve came not from outside

69

actors but from their own desire to protect the health of the community members and
secure continued access to the resources that come from the forest.
Prior to enrolling in the Payments for Hydrological Services (PSAH) program, the
communities had experience with the concept of the value of environmental services. Dr.
Julia Carabias, the director of a national NGO and later Secretary of the Environment of
Mexico from 1994-2000 told the community in the in a visit in the early 1990’s that they
should take care of their forests because it may someday bring a benefit to them. From
2001-2003 the community received payments from the NGO Ambio to build tree
nurseries and plant trees where the forest had been accidentally burned from traditional
slash and burn agricultural practices, a pioneering effort at community-based carbon
sequestration. In this program the community made the commitment to plant 15,000
trees for M$8,000 a year for the purpose of sequestering carbon1.
In the 2003-2005 period, Geoconservación supported the communities in two
significant conservation oriented initiatives, first seeking “certification,” i.e. a newly
created procedure for official government recognition for their conserved areas through
the national protected areas commission, CONANP and second, enrollment in a new
government PSAH program as a way for Santa Cruz and San Pedro to receive money for
the conservation in which they were already active. They thought that this will give the
communities motivation to continue conserving. The first step toward participating in the
CONAFOR program of PSAH that the communities took was to have the forests certified

1

A large section of these trees were later lost when the road was extended to the community of San
Antonio del Barrio.
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as community conserved areas (CCAs) through CONANP2. Though this certification was
not a requirement, it gave CONFAOR proof and assurance that the forests existed and
also that they were being protected. The decision to declare a community conserved area
was not unanimous but faced opposition by those with interest in cattle or possibly
forestry. The declaration of the CCAs represents the first time the communities had to
make any large, long term communal decision about land use and set the precedence for
collective action on conservation decisions.
The second step towards gaining participation in the PSAH was that the
communities of Santa Cruz and San Pedro had to formalize an alliance between
themselves and other local communities. Within the communities, collective action had
been strengthened and trust in conservation oriented leaders reinforced through working
towards participation in the PSAH program. This newfound social capital within the
communities helped form the basis for creating social capital between communities. All
of the communities which now form CORENCHI3 were having similar difficulty
attracting the attention of the municipality and federal aid agencies.

Santa Cruz

previously had a strong relationship with the community of San Antonio del Barrio and
San Pedro Tlatepusco which had a strong relationship with Santiago Tlatepusco because
of their location in the same watersheds. Even with these informal connections, there has
been a history of disputed over territory boundaries and some mistrust so that there had
previously been no tradition of inter-community organization. With the promise of the
PSAH and incomes from conservation, intercommunity trust was strengthened enough to
2

The certification procedure and official recognition of CCA’s as part of the natural protected areas system
was formalized as part of a 2008 modification to the environmental laws of Mexico (LGEEPA).
3
The seven communities in CORENCHI are Santa Cruz Tepetotutla, San Pedro Tlatepusco, San Antonio del
Barrio, Santiago Tlatepusco, San Antonio Analco, Nopalera and Vega del Sol.
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trust each other to work towards PSAH participation. Through collective action, they
organized CORENCHI and gathered enough political force to be noticed and given the
opportunity to work with CONAFOR in the PSAH program. In a series of meetings, they
decided to work together to help deal with the common problem of attracting attention
from the municipality.

In 2004, they signed an accord between the original four

communities in order to develop common rules about conservation, a significant step
towards regional land use planning. With the leadership of some community members,
the communities formally created CORENCHI in order to take advantage of the
CONAFOR programs and the PSAH program. The intercommunity organization of
CORENCHI was not required by CONAFOR but gained them enough attention to be
able to take advantage of the program. Once this alliance proved to be successful, the
nearby communities of Nopalera and Analco joined CORENCHI. Because the forests
owned by the CORENCHI communities are all extensions of the same forest, these
communities were also able to access the PSAH program.
In order to enter the PSAH the some community leaders had to put forth some
effort towards it. First, they had to convince the community members that this was the
right course of action for them. According to the then president of the comisariado of
San Pedro, they chose to enter the program so that they had more of a force to continue
conserving. They felt they needed to take advantage of this program because they had
never been offered money for what they were doing before and, if they did not join now,
maybe never would be offered money again (interview with Felipe Martinez Osorio, July
10, 2010). In both communities the land was already conserved and they had made the
decision to accept the certification as a CCA so there were few additional restrictions or
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work that had to be done to make themselves eligible for the PSAH and for this reason
some in the community were willing to enter the program. In both communities, some
members had to be convinced. This was accomplished by holding assemblies with
representatives from CONAFOR and Geoconservación. To enroll the communities the
authorities had to travel to Oaxaca as much as twice a month to attend workshops and
meetings and to sign paperwork. During this period the cost of this travel either had to be
paid by the leaders themselves or by voluntary contributions by community members.
This travel, and increased numbers of community meetings, represented the transaction
cost of entering the PSAH program.
The only stipulation of the PSA that comes from CONAFOR is that there is no
change in land use. To ensure that this is complied with both communities now must
build fire breaks around the corn fields before they are burned in preparation for planting.
The fire breaks are a practice that existed before entering the PSAH program but not to
the same extent. Occasional surveillance of the conservation area must be done to ensure
there are no fires and that no outsiders have entered the forest to hunt or cut wood. Both
communities have made signs to mark the project area and both have built surveillance
towers to watch for fires. Additional regulations (estatutos comunitarios) on forest use
and behavior have been set by the community but are not requirements of the PSAH
program. Regulations include the ban on hunting except for pest animals in corn fields,
restrictions on trash disposal and rules about the upkeep of home and yard. Thus,
collective action existed within the communities around conservation and lead to the
creation of inter-community organization and strengthened social capital in the form of
CORENCHI in order to take advantage of new opportunities for conservation.
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Agents from CONAFOR arrive in the community twice a year. One visit is to
observe the forest and the second is to deliver the money for the year.

On the

observational visit they walk through the forest and take pictures to make sure that there
has been no change. Additional observations are made via collecting satellite images of
the canopy cover of the forest.
Table 3.3: Total quantity in pesos (and US dollars) received by Santa Cruz and San
Pedro from the PSAH.
Community

Santa Cruz

San Pedro

Period

Total Area
(ha)

2004-2008

2,534.80

2007-2011

1,398.13

2009-2013

1,543.37

2004-2008

2,534.80

2007-2011

1,443.24

2009-2013

1,504.53

Amount for 5
years in M$
(US$)

No. of years
that have
been paid

5,069,604.38
(398,240.72)
2,652,923.69
(208,399.35)
3,326,342.46
(261,299.49)

5
3
1

5,069,604.38
(398,240.72)
2,770,101.71
(217,604.22)
3,209,394.88
(252,112.72)

5
3
1

Santa Cruz

Total area (ha) in
2010
2,941.50

Amount in M$ (US$) received
up to 2010
7,326,627.09 (575,540.23)

San Pedro

2,947.77

7,373,544.39 (579,382.91)

Community

Both San Pedro and Santa Cruz entered the PSAH in 2004.

In 2007 both

communities received expansions of their program areas. The first payments expired in
2008 and a portion of the area was renewed for the program period of 2009-2013 (Table
3.3). The total pesos received by Santa Cruz and San Pedro from the first payment in
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2004 to the disbursement of December 2009 were M$7,326,627.09 and M$7,373,544.39
respectively.

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS
The funds from CONAFOR were given in a single payment to the community
rather than in individual payments to each community member. The single payment is
made possible thanks to the communal land tenure system of comunidades and ejidos in
Mexico and where CONAFOR is able to distribute money in this manner, immediately
eliminates equity concerns of funds going only to rich land owners that is experienced in
other programs (Wunder et al. 2008, Kosoy et al. 2007). Each comunidad or ejido
participating in the PSAH has the ability to determine their own methods of distributing
the funds among members. Alix-Garcia et al. (2009) found that of the ejidos studied,
18% distributed all of the funds directly to the ejido members, 22% used all of the money
for conservation related forestry activities, 18% gave the full amount to investments in
non-forest related public goods and the remaining 42%

invested the funds in a

combination of those three strategies. Geoconservación was influential in this decision in
the CORENCHI communities. Another government payment that community members
receive is PROCAMPO, a corn subsidy, which is given directly to the individual corn
producers. The communities and Geoconservación knew from this experience that the
money from PROCAMPO is gone days after it is received and often spent on things
outside of the program goals, such as alcohol. In order to try to avoid this with the PSAH
payments, Geoconservación promoted a 10- 20- 70 scheme in the communities in which
70% would be available to the individual community members but not directly
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distributed, 20% used in community and conservation projects and 10% used for costs of
the community leaders.
In San Pedro the community members wanted to see a larger part of the money
distributed directly to the community members in cash payments with only the
community funds held in a bank account, so they adopted a scheme in which 80% goes to
the community members and 20% is kept for costs of community leaders and community
projects. That community members receive payments is important because it gives them
individual incentive to comply with the restrictions of the program (interview with Felipe
Martinez Osorio, July 12, 2010).

In Santa Cruz there are more community members

than San Pedro and if the money were given evenly to each member no one person would
receive very much. Community leaders argued that in the first year if they distributed the
money it would be M$16 a day per family which isn’t enough to buy everyone a soda. In
Santa Cruz the Assembly decided to distribute as cash a symbolic amount, but the
remainder would be used to establish an interest generating savings account to which
every community member contributes and has access. Each community member has an
amount in the bank that pertains to them and they can request the money in cash for such
things as medical emergencies, doctor’s bills, home improvements and other situations
upon approval from the comisariado. For example, access to funds has been granted for
the repayment of debt or to pay for a community member to immigrate to the United
States. Whether or not this money is given is at the discretion of the comisariado and no
one is allowed to take out all of their money except in the case of medical emergencies.
Community members are not allowed to remove their entire fund because they would no
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longer be contributing to the interest gain and thus would not be allowed to benefit from
the projects that use the fund.
During the sessions of CORENCHI in the first months of 2010, the decision
making on fund distribution was addressed at the regional level. The communities asked
CORENCHI to determine a distribution scheme that the delegates took to their respective
communities to be approved by the Assembly (Figure 3.1). The plan proposed by
CORENCHI keeps the 70% for payments to community members either directly or in
savings and 10% for costs of the comisariado but then breaks the remaining 20% into
smaller categories.

Two and a half percent must be given by each community to

CORENCHI so that the organization can function with its own budget. In addition, 12%
should be used for conservation projects, 3% given as scholarships to students wishing to

Figure 3.1: Distribution of funds proposed by CORENCHI
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study beyond that which is available in the community and 2.5% given to the families of
the members of the comisariado to buy food and to compensate for work lost during their
service to the community. The contributions to the families of the comisariado and to
CORENCHI help to strengthen social capital by allowing CORENCHI to function
without requesting money periodically from the community and by allowing to members
of the comisariado to devote more time and energy to their public service without
worrying about their families suffering as a result.
Santa Cruz adopted the scheme set forth by CORENCHI with a few modifications
(Figure 3.2). The Assembly decided not to give 2.5% to the families of the comisariado.
The president of the comisariado in Santa Cruz for the 2007-2010 period was accused of
stealing money from the community. The money stolen was not from the PSAH funds
and, when the theft was discovered, the president was made to pay the money back. This
Figure 3.2: Distribution used in Santa Cruz (after approval from the Assembly)
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resulted not only in the president losing his position but in the community losing some
trust in the authorities. At this point the Assembly decided that the money that had been
saved in the account should be withdrawn from the bank and distributed to the
community. Married couples received M$20,000 and individuals M$10,000 minus any
amount they may have used prior to this date. The date of this distribution could not be
agreed upon by community authorities but presumably happened sometime after the 2009
disbursement in December of 2008 but before the 2010 funds arrived in December of
2009. This incident also caused enough mistrust in the authorities to cause the Assembly
to vote against giving any part of the conservation money to the families of the
comisariado as a compensation for their service to the community. Also, the 72.5%
which goes directly to the community members is not given in direct cash payments.
Instead a small amount, M$500/person during the study year, is given in cash and the
remainder, M$1,500/person is saved in the communal bank account. The elderly receive
their full payment in cash in small increments over the year. The idea is that they will not
benefit from the interest accrued from saving the money and thus do not need to
contribute.
In Santa Cruz the money that is in the account can be requested if the individual
has need. A request must be made to the comisariado. If the money is needed for a
medical emergency up to 100% can be taken from the account. For all other uses,
including non-emergency medical uses, up to 50% can be used. Of the 59 households
surveyed in Santa Cruz, 38 (64%) had asked for money from this fund one or more times.
Thirty-three of the households used the money for medical costs including medicine, six
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used the money to make home improvements and 9 used the money for other purposes
such as education, clothing, food and repaying debts.
San Pedro also did not adopt the CORENCHI proposal and introduced its own
modifications. The Assembly in San Pedro preferred to keep a scheme similar to the
Figure 3.3: Distribution in San Pedro (after approval from the Assembly)
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original 80/20 distribution, but including the payment to CORENCHI (Figure 3.3). This
is for several reasons. San Pedro has roughly a third of the population of Santa Cruz but
receives slightly more money from the PSAH. This means that when the money is split
up among community members it is a larger amount per family than when it is split
between community members in Santa Cruz. At the Assembly the community members
decided that they would rather have the money themselves than keep it in a bank account.
Since they give the money directly to the community members, money from the fund can
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only be requested by an individual in the cases of health emergencies. When money is
given it is given as an interest free loan and must be repaid.
Within the twenty percent kept for the community there is money programmed in
to pay day wages for working on fire breaks, creating paid employment in the community
and an additional source of income for some members. The bracken fern burns hot and
there is always a risk that a fire set in a corn field may escape into the bracken fern and be
carried into the forest. With the CCA and the PSAH the community cannot allow fires to
escape into the forest. Before fields are burned to plant corn fire breaks must be built and
the labor of the whole community is needed. Even individuals who are not comuneros
receive money to work on the fire breaks, resulting in benefits of the PSAH spilling over

Figure 3.4: Community opinion on the fairness of the distribution of funds from the
PSAH
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to non-community members who cannot benefit directly. This is an encouragement to
participate in community work and also to stay and work towards becoming a community
member. In the last year M$2000 from the community fund was given to every house for
chicken wire to fence in their chickens. In August of 2009 every individual who worked
the tequios (community work days) was given M$8000. If individuals worked less or did
not work at all they received M$4000 or nothing. This payment was also given to
individuals who are not comuneros provided that they had participated in the tequios.

COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF THE PSAH
In the household survey, subjects were asked if they agreed with the way money
was distributed to the community members (Figure 3.4).

Opinion within the

communities was primarily positive towards the equity of the distribution of the funds.
Those who could neither approve nor disapprove of the distribution claimed to have no
knowledge of how much others in the community were receiving. Three subjects in
Santa Cruz and one in San Pedro did not consider the distribution fair because single
individuals and the elderly did not receive as much as a married couple. In one case in
San Pedro, the household did not receive payments because the head of household
declined a leadership position he was assigned because of, according to him, a
misunderstanding and mistakes in documentation. One woman interviewed in Santa
Cruz disagreed because even though she and her husband both receive a quantity of
money, both parts are given to her husband and he does not give her portion to her. In
her opinion, the comisariado should give her husband his half and she should receive
hers. A second female respondent in Santa Cruz disagreed because even though she is a
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comunera and her husband not an official community member, the comisariado requires
that she sign for the money but then gives the money to her husband. This indicates that
women may not be benefiting equally as men under the rules of distribution. Those who
qualified their agreement with the way the funds are distributed to community members
stated either that everyone receives equal or that the distribution was determined by the
Assembly and thus they have to approve.
The survey asked the subjects if they agree with how the funds from the PSAH
are allocated within the community, i.e., if they agree with the schemes outlines in
Figures 3 and Figure 4. Again, opinions were overwhelmingly in agreement with the
distribution determined by the Assembly (Figure 3.5). In Santa Cruz 79% agreed while
4% were unsure and in San Pedro 81% were in favor of the distribution. Those who
Figure 3.5: Opinion regarding the allocation of funds within the community.
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qualified their agreement either stated that they agreed because it was voted on by the
Assembly or that they approved because if the funds were not used for such things,
particularly the costs of the comisariado, that the people would have to contribute the
money out of their pockets. The small percentage who disagreed had various reasons for
disagreement. A female subject in Santa Cruz believed that some of the money should
be allocated towards the schools and health center, neither of which is currently
considered in the distribution in Figure 3.2. In both Santa Cruz and San Pedro subjects
disagreed with how the money was being allocated because there was no transparency in
how much the comisariado was using and on what. Other respondents thought that all of
the money should be distributed to the community members directly without keeping
aside some for community costs and projects. One respondent in San Pedro did not think
the community should give any money to CORENCHI because, in his words (translated),
“if the money is ours it should be ours.”
When asked if the payments from the PSAH were worth the restrictions placed on
use of the forest, seventy two percent of the respondents to the surveys responded in the
affirmative. Though seventy two percent is fewer than those who agreed with the equity
of the distribution (85%) and those who agree with the way the funds are distributed
among uses in the community (82.2%), it is still largely positive in favor of the PSAH
program. These three variables, along with whether or not the respondents feel they are
better off economically because of the payments from the PSAH (83.9%), a variable
which will be discussed in more detail below, show an overall positive perception of the
PSAH program among community members.

The only variable which indicated

dissatisfaction with the PSAH program was whether or not the payments received are
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enough for the service that is being provided. In this case only 21.2% of the respondents
gave a positive response. Many believed that, although they agree with how the money is
being used in the community, that they are personally better off because of it, and that the
money is worth the additional restrictions on forest use, that they should be receiving
higher compensation.

USES OF FUNDS IN THE COMMUNITY AND IMPACT ON HOUSEHOLDS
The funds from the PSAH have been used differently at the household and at the
community levels. In Santa Cruz, the community fund created with the money accrues
interest as it sits in the bank. This interest can be used for community activities that fall
outside of the scheme described in Figure 3.2. The PSAH funds were used in Santa Cruz
to help buy the community van and also to finish the ecotourism station that was initiated
by Fundación Modelo.
In San Pedro the community has used the funds from the PSAH to put up signs
delineating the conservation area. Also, they pay for meetings held in their community or
for the authorities to travel to meetings. The fund is also used to pay day wages for
workers who are constructing the fire breaks. They have bought hoses to improve the
potable water system in the community and have given money to individuals to build
fences for chickens to improve public sanitation. As part of the conservation efforts
groups are sent into the forest to look for poachers and fires. The day wages and
expenses of these workers are paid from PSAH.
In both communities the fund has been an important resource for the comisariado.
Participation in the PSAH requires higher transaction costs in the form of travel than
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before to attend meetings and workshops and to deal with PSAH related paperwork in the
cities of Tuxtepec and Oaxaca. Previously if the authorities had to travel the community
members would each give money to help pay for the trip. With the funds from the PSAH
the authorities can make these trips without asking for money, another positive impact on
household incomes. The funds have also made the formation of CORENCHI not only
necessary but possible and the funds are now helping to pay for meetings and activities.
Figure 3.6: Perceived improvement in economic welfare as a result of participation in
the PSAH

The funds have been put to use by individuals as well. In Santa Cruz 38 of the 59
households surveyed used money from their fund in the bank. In San Pedro of the 29
households interviewed, 8 had asked for loans from the PSAH funds for medical bills and
of those, four received or accepted the loan. Most of those who responded to the survey,
83.9%, agreed that their economic situation had improved and that they are better off
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financially now than they were before the PSAH payments (Figure 3.6). A few subjects
in Santa Cruz felt that they were in the same financial situation as before. Several
subjects felt that they are worse off because of the payments. The reasons stated for this

Figure 3.7: The first and second most important uses of the payments as reported by
survey respondents.
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negative response centered around restrictions on the forest such as an inability to hunt
and decreased yields from using less crop land more intensively, so for some community
members opportunity cost seems to be higher than for others. One of the most common
uses of the PSAH money is the purchase of food (Figure 3.7) which may be a result of
lower crop yields and hunting restrictions. It is important to note that, though attributed
to the PSAH by some of the respondents to the survey, the crop rotation and restrictions
to the agricultural zone as well as the hunting ban are self imposed community
regulations and not required by the PSAH program. Only a portion of the forested land
in the territory of either community is enrolled in the PSAH as a result of hectare limits.
The restriction in hunting is also internally imposed in the communities and not a
stipulation of the PSAH program.
The survey asked respondents to list the first and second most important items or
services that they have purchased using the funds from the PSAH. The three most
mentioned uses of the money were reported to be housing improvements, food and
medical costs (Figure 3.7) and the three most common second purchases were food,
medical costs, and household expenses (Figure 3.7).
In San Pedro, participation in the PSAH has allowed people to trade traditional
mud floor thatched roof homes for cement floors, concrete walls and roofs (Figure 3.8).
Also, before the payments were received, most community members only had income in
lump sums when there was a harvest. The money from the PSAH provides money that
can help residents meet needs between harvests, thus smoothing out the flow of income.
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Figure 3.8: Traditional thatched roof home and new cement and tin home in San
Pedro

Poverty in Mexico is defined in three levels by SEDESOL based on the average
household income in pesos per person per day: nutritional poverty, capability poverty and
asset poverty (SEDESOL 2002). In Santa Cruz, the average income per person per day
including money received from the PASH program is well above all three levels of
poverty at 32.5 pesos per person per day. In San Pedro the average income per person
per day is 18.97 pesos, which is above nutritional poverty, barely above capability
poverty and below asset poverty (Table 3.4). In the table, mean household income per
person per day without PES is used as a comparison in order to determine the impact of
the PSAH program on poverty. This number was determined by taking total annual
income and subtracting total income from PES, dividing that by the number in the
household and dividing that by 365 days and averaging the household results.
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7.31
(0.57)

San Pedro

18.97
(1.49)

46.96
(3.69)

4.12
(0.32)

Santa Cruz

20.43
(1.60)

65.44
(5.14)

5.22
(0.41)

11.2
(0.88)

34.62
(2.72)

2.79
(0.22)

NO PES

San Pedro

Asset Poverty

Minimum
household income
per person per day
in pesos (US$).

82.79
(6.50)

Capability Poverty

Maximum
household income
per person per day
in pesos (US$).

32.5
(2.55)

Nutritional Poverty

Mean household
income per person
per day in pesos
(US$)

Santa Cruz

PES

Community

Table 3.4: Mean Income and Poverty Levels. Mean household income per person per
day in Santa Cruz and San Pedro compared to national poverty levels in pesos (and US
dollars) per person per day with PES income and without PES income

15.4 (1.21)

18.9
(1.48)

28.1
(2.21)

15.4 (1.21)

18.9
(1.48)

28.1
(2.21)

INDIRECT BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION
Through informal and semi-structured interviews non-monetary benefits of the
PSAH also became clear.

The receipt of the payments has bolstered belief that

conservation pays and will ensure that community members will want to continue
conserving as well as increased trust in the leadership, trust in CORENCHI and inspired
collective action at the intercommunity level. Felipe Martinez Osorio (president of the
comisariado, interview July 12, 2010) stated that he has noticed it raining more since
they began conserving, indicating a beneficial change in weather. True or not, this
indicates a positive perception of changes attributed to participation in the PSAH
program. The resources available to the comisariado to travel make it possible for
community leaders to attend more meetings in Oaxaca and other communities. At these
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meetings they have the opportunity to network with other community leaders and agency
workers. These meetings and workshops are ideal opportunities to learn about new
programs and opportunities for the community. This increases the social capital between
the communities by increasing the possibility of support from other sources.

The

international NGO Global Diversity Fund (GDF) is currently working with the
CORENCHI communities to help them develop management plans for their conservation
area.

Oliverio Pedro Osorio Robles, community leader and former president of

CORENCHI, met the leaders of GDF at a meeting with Geoconservación about the
PSAH program. Some members of the community have used the money from the PSAH
to send children to school which is an investment in human capital. Oliverio himself
stated that he learned a lot about time management and organization through involvement
with the PSAH program, an example of an increase in human capital. An increase in
human capital will have long term effects in the community as comuneros are better
educated and have better access and more confidence in relating to the world outside of
the community. Health has reportedly improved in both communities as more people
have access to doctors and medicine. Several people mentioned that the PSAH means
that there is less pressure to leave the community or immigrate to the United States to
find work.

OPPOSITION AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS
Several individuals in both communities were against the PSAH from the start.
Much of the initial opposition was a result of a misunderstanding of the program and
mistrust of the government. Some community members thought that they were selling
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their forests to the government or that participation would give the government the ability
to take the forest away from them later or increase the restrictions on forest use. Both
communities are against the idea of their land becoming declared a biosphere reserve, a
proposal pushed by CONANP, and some worried the PSAH would bring them closer to
that possibility. There is limited space for pasture, and in recent years only a handful of
people in each community have had cattle and herds have been reduced in size. Those
who had cows opposed the program because it would increase the restrictions on where
they could graze their cows.
Some negative results are attributed to the PSAH program. Declaration of the
conservation area has led to less use of the forests as the community has imposed internal
regulations of farming, firewood collecting and hunting. Though these regulations are
self imposed and not required by the PSAH, community members do not often
distinguish between self imposed regulations, regulations from the conserved area and
regulations imposed by the PSAH. Many have given up keeping animals because of there
has been an increase in jaguar encounters since the imposition of hunting restrictions and
the expansion of conservation and forest cover has reportedly drawn the jaguars closer to
the community (Figel 2008).
Some negative results can be attributed to the PSAH program. For example, since
both communities use traditional slash and burn techniques, the building of fire breaks is
imperative to protect the forest and to continue receiving payments. This practice was
used before participating in the program, but not to the extent it is used now since
conscription into the PSAH program. For San Pedro, where the problem of the invasive
bracken fern makes escaped fires a real threat, the requirement of the fire breaks has
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increased their work load and meant that there is less time for their own work. One
benefit from the PSAH is that the funds from the PSAH pay the day wages of fire break
workers, creating a new source of paid employment. A second negative result of the
PSAH is that, because of the work required by the PSAH, there is a much larger work
burden on the authorities than before. Most in the higher positions do not have the time
to tend their own fields anymore and must buy food rather than grow their own. The
authorities in San Pedro have the option of taking money from the PSAH to compensate
for some of the losses but many, such as the current president of the comisariado, choose
not to exercise this option because they are afraid it will lead to mistrust and problems
with other community members. He is valuing his reputation in the community higher
than the financial capital he could gain by exercising the ability to use the PSAH funds
for his family. The communities have more meetings now to deal with issues related to
the PSAH which demands time of all community members. In San Pedro they began
paying day wages for work related to the PSAH from the funds of the PSAH program.
Now in San Pedro people only want to work if they will be paid when before everyone
worked voluntarily when there was something that needed to be done. These voluntary
work days, called tequios, were previously expected of comuneros. There has been some
conflict in the assemblies if there is disagreement in what has been distributed or how the
funds have been used. Disagreements over money did not happen before there was
money.
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PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY AND VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE
All three of the major organizations involved, CONAFOR (federal government),
CORENCHI (grassroots organization) and Geoconservación, (NGO) have put into
practice some efforts towards a sustainable program that will create a system of payment
that includes more direct connections between users of the services and the communities
who protect the forests which provide them thus more closely meeting the requirement of
direct exchange desired by Wunder (2005) and others. Currently, funding comes from
water user fees, funding from CONAFOR, the World Bank, the government of Japan and
several other international donors. The funding is only sustainable as long as the donors
continue to give and the government administration looks favorably on these projects,
and the government is already indicating that the program will not continue forever in its
current form. For this reason, there is currently much discussion about how to sustain
and possibly increase payments to the communities for conservation.
In Santa Cruz there had been a previous attempt to make a connection between
the brewery Grupo Modelo and the community. Grupo Modelo assisted the community
in making trail signs and building a research and eco-tourism lodge in the community.
They did this by donating money to a Mexico City based NGO called Betadiversidad.
The community felt it was correct for Grupo Modelo to be involved because they know
that this and other companies use the water that they produce and feel that “every drop of
water here goes to the rivers and the fish and if it is contaminated even the beer will be
bad.” (Oliverio Pedro Osorio Robles, Santa Cruz, personal communication).
The PSAH will not continue indefinitely and the communities are actively
considering alternative programs to continue receiving conservation payments. Knowing
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what the communities would be willing to accept from these programs before entering
into an agreement is valuable and will be addressed in the following chapter. The
communities of CORENCHI may be eligible for REDD+ programs. The World Bank
and UNDP are considering the communities for this program. Currently CONAFOR has
started a program of matching funds titled “Promoting Local Payment Mechanisms for
Ecosystem Services through Matching Funds” (fondo concurrente) in which private or
corporate interests may match one for one the money offered by CONAFOR to the
individuals and communities participating in the PSAH and other PES programs
(CONAFOR 2011). CONAFOR will continue to contribute to the projects for no fewer
than five years but no longer than fifteen (CONAFOR 2011). So far there are several
companies interested in participating including the Cultural Institute of Oaxaca,
Chevrolet dealerships, the rock group The Jaguars, beverage company Gugar and several
local artists. Some of these groups are located in the city of Oaxaca, which is not
downstream of the CORENCHI communities. Participation in the fondos concurrentes
may prove to be more a form of social philanthropy than a market based or Coasian
mechanism for resource provisioning.
The organization, CORENCHI, was originally formed in a successful effort at
collective action to be able to present a united negotiating front of 6 communities (soon
to be seven) rather than 6 individual ones, in order to channel more benefits from
municipal, state, and federal government programs. The communities now know that
they can use CORENCHI and the attention and power it has been able to attract to find
additional programs that can help them continue to profit from conservation. One of the
main goals of CORENCHI in this moment is to find more companies to join the fondo

95

concurrente or pledge support in other ways. Some of the companies benefit from the
water being produced or benefit through social philanthropy and they are also the main
environmental contaminators (Oliverio Pedro Osorio Robles, personal communication).

TRUST, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND GOVERNANCE
In case studies of PES in other parts of the world, social capital and trust has had
to be created between actors in order for them to create new institutions for the purpose
of taking advantage of PES programs, particularly for water services which require large
portions of land to be included in the program to provide the desired services (Southgate
and Wunder 2009, Kerr 2002, Muradian et al. 2009). In the communities in this study a
substantial degree of trust and social capital existed within the communities already.
Participation in the PSAH not only has the opportunity to strengthen the existing social
capital at the community level but has also generated trust and resulting social capital
represented by the creation of CORENCHI. Internal governance in the communities
aided this formation and the emergence of governance at the regional level.
There have been changes in the relationship between the community and the
authorities in power at any given time as a result of participation in the PSAH program.
There has been a positive change and also a negative change. The negative change is
because, previously, there was no risk that the authorities would misuse their position to
steal money since there was little money involved. Now there is fear that the authorities
could steal PSAH money. This new mistrust of the authorities because of the money is
balanced with increasing faith in the authorities because work and promises have paid
off. The community leaders who discussed conservation for many years have been
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validated as now the community receives money for the conservation they are practicing.
Before the people of the community did not believe conservation would get them
anywhere nor did they understand what it was. Though many still do not understand
conservation, they now see that it brings benefits.
On the basis of responses from the semi structured and informal interviews, there
is greater trust between the communities. They communicate and intermarry more than
before, as made evidence by my guide, Carmen, in San Pedro who was originally from
Santa Cruz but married a man in San Pedro. In all the CORENCHI communities the
people are more organized and knowledgeable about environmental issues and projects in
which the community is involved. The formation of CORENCHI has allowed for many
workshops and trainings to come to the communities, forming a strong base for collective
action
.
SUMMARY
This chapter presented the results of the interviews, semi-structured interviews
and structured surveys. Through these methods the formation of the internal and regional
governance which have allowed the communities to participate in the PSAH program and
make good use of the funds in the community became clear. Collective action and
collective decision making has been important in determining a fair and equitable
distribution of the funds within the communities. This style of decision making has
resulted in favorable opinions on the distribution and use of the funds within the
community by the community members. Accessing and utilizing the PSAH program has
allowed households to improve their wellbeing by increasing incomes and allowing for
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improved diets, homes and access to medical care. More indirect benefits of participation
may become clear over time as the community makes investments and investigates
sustainable options to continue benefiting from conservation.
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CHAPTER IV –RESULTS OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT CARBON PAYMENTS

In the final section of the structured surveys, participants were asked questions
about the potential of participating in additional compensation for conservation programs.
First, the survey asked if the participants would be willing to participate in a payments for
carbon services program. Then, the respondents were given two scenarios in Santa Cruz
and three scenarios in San Pedro.

The first scenario was payment for carbon

sequestration in land that is within the community’s conserved area (CCA) but not
currently receiving payments for water services. The second scenario was the expansion
of conservation into coffee plots through cutting down coffee plants and cutting forest
trees. The third scenario asked in San Pedro was for a project of reforestation in the land
currently covered by the invasive bracken fern. In each of these scenarios the respondent
was asked to state the amount of compensation (willingness to accept or WTA) they
would ask to provide the stated service. The mean responses are shown in table 4.1.
Southgate et al. (2009) found links in willingness to accept and willingness to
participate in the amount of compensation being offered and the amount of land required
respectively. In Costa Rica they found that the farmers with a successful commercial
crop were less willing to forgo agricultural land and would require larger payments to
participate. This may result in poor farmers being more open to participation, thus
leading toward the goal of poverty alleviation, but means that is important hydrologic
areas are owned by relatively wealthy farmers, higher payments would be required to
protect the important land. In terms of whether or not PES should be used as a poverty
alleviation tool this is significant as more poor can participate as they demand less but
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unless they are the owners of the important land in terms of service provision it may be
worth it to pay higher prices to wealthier land owners. If payments were not equal then
the poor would tend to receive less than more well off participants, thus not truly being
useful for poverty alleviation (Southgate et al. 2009). My study investigates the same
issues in a common property regime where the recipients of the payments are
communities with internal governance determining funds distribution rather than
payments to individual land owners and investigates this in two contexts, one in which
the burden in shared by the entire community (in the conservation area or the area
covered by the invasive bracken fern) and one in which the burden of conservation would
be borne by individuals (namely, the owners of the included coffee plots).
The first question asked in this section of the survey is whether or not the
respondent would be willing to participate in a second PES program. I have already
discussed in Chapter 1 the barriers to participation in PES programs (as explained by
Wunder 2008, Pagiola et al. 2005, Landell-Mills and Porras 2002) and how this applies
in the case of the PSAH program. The first barrier to participation was eligibility, From
San Pedro and Santa Cruz’s prior participation in a hydrology PES, it is clear that the
land produces that target service, and from the same forested area the production of
carbon sequestering services can be expected. The second barrier to participation, and
the one explicitly addressed in this survey, is desire to participate. High opportunity cost
may prevent some poor from participating but I established that the opportunity cost of
land in the conservation area is low. The survey asks about a second payment program in
the conservation area which would have the same low opportunity cost but also asks
about a program in individually owned coffee plots, where opportunity cost might be
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higher. The survey questions also imply that the delivery of the hypothetical second
program would be in the same manner as the PSAH, that is provided by a government
agency, CONAFOR, and guaranteed for five years. This eliminates distrust in a new
intermediary as a barrier to participation in a second PES program.
Table 4.1: Summary of WTA: Variable names, descriptions and summary statistics
for a carbon payment program in the conservation area, coffee plots and bracken fern.
Variable

WTA_CONS

WTA_COFFEE

WTA_FERN

Description

Mean

What the respondent feels is
the least they will accept to be
paid for a carbon PES program
in the conservation area. Price
is given per hectare per year.
What the respondent feels is
the least they can accept to be
paid for a PES program that
requires them to give up their
coffee fields. Price is given
per hectare per year.
What the respondent feels is
the least they can accept to be
paid for a PES program that
requires them to plant trees in
the area that is covered by
brackenfern. Price is given per
hectare per year.
This
question was only asked in
San Pedro

St. Dev

Min

Max

1,180.87
(92.76)

1518.05
(119.25)

150
(11.78)

8000
(628.44)

3,714.13
(291.76)

2647.86
(208)

50
(3.93)

10000
(785.55)

344,183.3
(270337.1
8)

662543.2
(52045.8)

800
(62.84)

2000000
(157109.
19)

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT – CARBON PAYMENTS IN CONSERVATION
AREA
All of the subjects were asked if they would be willing for the community to
participate in an additional payment for environmental services program, specifically one
for carbon capture. The question asked was “Would you be interested in participating in
a program in which you would be paid to either plant trees or continue conserving the
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forests with the end of removing carbon from the air?” In 42% of the surveys, the
investigator explained the price of carbon to the subject. At the time of the study, the
price of a ton of carbon on the Chicago Climate Exchange was ten American cents, or
one tenth of US dollar4. According to a review of studies by Gibbs et al. (2007),
Mesoamerican tropical forests sequester approximately 200 tons per hectare. With an
exchange rate of 12.73 pesos to the dollar in June of 2010, I rounded the number to two
hundred pesos per hectare as the market value for carbon that was explained to the
subjects. The interviewer explained that the community has a certain amount of land in
the conservation area and of this land only a part is currently receiving payments from the
PSAH program while the remainder of the land receives no conservation payments. The
question asked was “What should the community accept per hectare per year in payments
for the capture of carbon inside the 5,000 hectares that do not have a payment within the
area of conservation?”
Of the 88 subjects, 82 were willing to respond to the question. Of those 82, 72
(87.8%) were in favor of participation in an additional project. Of those 72, 69 were
willing to name a minimum price they would be willing to accept. However, it was
difficult for the interviewers to obtain answers from some of the subjects. Many were
uncomfortable naming a price for something that would typically be a community
decision made by the Assembly. Interviewers assured the subjects that their responses
would not be made known to the rest of the community that no decisions were being

4

This price represents a collapse of carbon prices in 2010, down from a high of around $10 a few years
before. As of December 31, 2010 the Chicago Climate Exchange shut down its carbon trading system
(Gronewold 2011)
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made based on their response and each subject was encouraged to give the same opinion
they would voice in an Assembly gathering if such a decision were being made.
Responses from the subjects for what they would be willing to accept for
participating in a new PES program based on carbon capture within the conservation area
that already exists ranged from 150 to 8000 pesos (or 11.78 to 628.44 US dollars, Figure
4.1). The mean response was 1180.87 pesos and the median response was 600 pesos.

Frequency

Figure 4.1: Distribution of WTA, conservation: The distribution of responses for
willingness to accept for participating in an additional PES program within the
existing area of conservation (WTA_CONS)
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Heckman Selection Models were used to determine factors influencing the
quantity stated by respondents that they would be willing to accept (WTA) for a new
conservation program. Given that how much a household will accept for the carbon
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capture program depends on whether the household is willing to participate in the
program we consider Heckman Selection approach (Heckman 1979) to empirically model
the WTA conditional on their willingness to participate in the program.
The first model found that, for both communities, gender, whether or not I
explained the market price of Carbon at the time, if respondents thought that the money
was given equally to all community members and whether or not they have used money
from the fund, to be significantly correlated to how much they stated they were willing to
accept (Table 2a).
Table 4.2a: Heckman Selection Model Results: willingness to accept payment for
carbon services in conservation area (Dependent variable: WTA_CONS,
WANTNEWPES)
Number of observations = 79
Z
p > |z|
Independent variables influencing the amount the subject was willing to accept for a
second PES program in the conservation area
2.52
0.012
GENDER
3.92
< 0.001
CARBMARK
-3.75
< 0.001
EQUALDIST
2.28
0.023
USEFUND
-0.24
0.811
_CONS
Independent variables influencing whether or not the subject was willing to
participate in the proposed second PES program
12.49
< 0.001
WANTNEWPES
-12.49
< 0.001
CHILDOUT
-2.2
0.028
AGREEDIST
3.4
0.001
ECONIMPROVE
-7.9
< 0.001
COMMUNITY
6.46
0.000
_CONS
Log Likelihood = -586.1364 wald chi2(6) = 707E+07
LR test of ind. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)=11.14 prob> chi2 = 0.0008
Whether or not the respondent was interested in a new PES program in the
conservation area, depending on whether they said yes or no to a new PES on the survey,
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was influenced by whether or not they have children living outside of the community, if
they agree with the use of the PSAH money within the community, if they feel their
economic situation has improved because of the PSAH and which community they are a
member of. Interestingly, in this model if a respondent did not agree with how the money
is spent in the community (as determined by the distribution shown in figure 3.3) they
were more likely to be interested in a new PES program. Similarly, those who did not
believe that the money from the PSAH is distributed equally among community members
had a higher WTA. Not surprisingly, the fewer children a respondent had living outside
of the community the more likely they were to want a new PES. Children living outside
of the community are often a source of income as they send remittances. Also, those in
Santa Cruz were more likely to want a new PES program than those in San Pedro. By
this model the predicted mean WTA was M$1,395.85/ha/year compared to an actual
mean of 1180.87 pesos per hectare per year (Table 4.2b).

Table 4.2b: Predicted Mean WTA for carbon PES in the conservation area from the
Heckman Selection Model number one.
variable
Observations Mean
Std
Min
Max
deviation
CONS_M1
73
1395.852
936.205
93.82726
3670.957
(133.22)
I ran a second Heckman selection model to include household size and composition
(Table 3a). I added the number of residents, children and elderly as this may be a factor
in both how much money is received from the PSAH and the costs and needs of the
household. I found no significance of any of those factors, however, including them in
the model made whether or not anyone in the household had used money from the fund
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(meaning taken money from the bank in Santa Cruz or asked for a loan in San Pedro) no
longer significant. By this model the predicted mean WTA was 1,397 pesos per hectare
per year (Table 4.3b).
Table 4.3a: Heckman selection Model Results: willingness to accept payment for
carbon services in conservation area with household size and composition included.
(Dependent variables: WTA_CONS, WANTNEWPES)
Number of observations = 79
z
p > |z|
Independent variables influencing the amount the subject was willing to accept for a
second PES program in the conservation area
2.49
0.013
GENDER
3.61
< 0.001
CARBMARK
-4.62
< 0.001
EQUALDIST
1.66
0.097
USEFUND
-0.72
0.470
RESIDENTS
0.52
0.604
CHILDREN
-0.35
0.727
ELDERLY
0.42
0.675
_CONS
Independent variables influencing whether or not the subject was willing to participate
in the proposed second PES program
8.08
< 0.001
WANTNEWPES
-5.69
< 0.001
CHILDOUT
-2.06
0.039
AGREEDIST
3.43
0.001
ECONIMPROVE
-9.9
< 0.001
COMMUNITY
2.51
0.012
_CONS
Log Likelihood -585.8799 wald chi2(6) = 3.05E+08
LR test of ind. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)=11.03 prob> chi2 = 0.0009
Table 4.3b: Predicted mean WTA for carbon PES in conservation area from Hekman
Selection model number two.
Variable
Observations Mean
Std
Min
Max
deviation
Cons_M2
73
1397.105
946.851
-27.51388
3758.901
(109.75)

106

Next, I ran the model adding whether or not the head of household has held any
leadership positions. The community’s participation in the PSAH has meant extra work
for those with leadership positions. This and the idea that those who have held leadership
positions would be more knowledgeable about the PSAH were reasons to include this as
a factor in the model (Table 4.4a). Whether or not the head of household has held a
cargo did not influence how much they were willing to accept for a second PES program.
The predicted mean WTA from this model was 1383.806 pesos per hectare per year
(Table 4.4b).
Table 4.4a: Heckman selection Model Results: willingness to accept expansion of
conservation into coffee plots with household size and leadership roles. (Dependent
variables: WTA_CONS, WANTNEWPES)
Number of observations=68
Variable
Z score
p > |z|
Independent variables influencing the amount the subject was willing to accept for a
second PES program in the conservation area
GENDER
2.38
0.017
CARBMARK
3.09
0.002
EQUALDIST
-3.91
< 0.001
USEFUND
1.69
0.091
RESIDENTS
-0.95
0.344
CHILDREN
0.96
0.338
ELDERLY
-0.10
0.921
CARGO
1.00
0.319
_cons
0.05
0.957
Independent variables influencing whether or not the subject was willing to participate
in the proposed second PES program
WANTNEWPES
7.21
< 0.001
CHILDOUT
-5.19
< 0.001
AGREEDIST
-6.05
< 0.001
ECONIMPROVE
7.84
< 0.001
COMMUNITY
-5.44
< 0.001
_CONS
1.46
0.145
Log Likelihood -585.3639 wald chi2(6) = 2.39E+07
LR test of ind. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)=11.03 prob> chi2 = 0.0007
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Table 4.4b: The predicted mean value of WTA for carbon PES in the conservation area
from the third Heckman Selection Model
Variable
Observations
Mean
Std deviation Min
Max
Cons_M3

73

1383.806
(108.70)

945.7682

-149.3408

3776.826

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT- CARBON PAYMENTS IN COFFEE PLOTS
The previous set of questions explored WTA for a program in communal areas of
the community territory where access is already limited and conservation is already being
practiced.

The second round of questions explores WTA for carbon sequestration

programs in the coffee fields. Because of the nature of coffee as a crop that requires a
large amount of investment and maintenance for an annual crop, coffee plots are the only
part of community territory that is considered as private property by individual
community members and can be passed on to family members. Corn fields are only used
by individuals for particular periods of planting and harvesting and cannot be altered to
any use other than corn. Neither type of land can be sold. Coffee fields are the only part
of the community territory that can be entered into a carbon payment program and be
expected to provide additional benefits that would not have otherwise been provided.
The question was asked, what is the least you would accept for converting your
coffee fields into tree plantations for carbon sequestration. Responses were given in
amount per hectare per year for a period of five years. A single response of 9,000,000
pesos was dropped because it was an outlier. I counted that response instead with the
respondents who said that there was no amount they would be willing to accept in order
to give up coffee fields for conservation because nine million pesos seems unrealistically
high.
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Subjects replied to this question one of three ways. First, several individuals
declined to respond.

The reasons they gave for declining were that they were

uncomfortable discussing money, they did not feel they could respond to a question they
felt needed to be asked to the Assembly or they were simply bored with the survey and
wished to stop.

Second, many who had responded to the previous question about

willingness to accept for land already under conservation responded that there was no
amount of money they could be given to abandon their coffee fields. Stated reasons for
this response were that there was plenty of land already in conservation and no need to
expand into the agricultural areas and that the coffee fields were the only thing they
owned and that they relied on them for food, firewood and income. Third, subjects gave
a number in pesos per hectare per year that they would be willing to accept to convert
their coffee fields to conservation. Sixty nine of the subjects responded to this question.
Of those 69, 47 (68%) were willing to give a price that they would be willing to accept
while twenty two (32%) responded that there was no price that they would be willing to
accept to expand conservation into their coffee fields.
Heckman selection models were used to find the factors that influenced the
willingness to accept for the expansion of conservation into coffee plots for those who
would be willing to accept an amount (Heckman 1979, Table 4.5a). Factors influencing
WTA were gender, whether or not the household receive remittance, the total amount the
household receives from PES, community, the total household income, and the
percentage of the household income that comes from government programs. Women
respondents gave higher responses than men. The less remittance by the household
received or the less the household receives from PES the higher their WTA. The higher
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Table 4.5a: Heckman selection Model for willingness to accept carbon payments for
land in coffee plots. (Dependent variables: WTA_COFFEE, WTA_COFFEE_YESNO)
Number of observations = 68
z
p > |z|
variables
Independent variables influencing the amount the subject was willing to accept for a
second PES program on land in coffee plots
646.09
< 0.001
GENDER
-319.92
< 0.001
REMITTANCE
-701.37
< 0.001
TOTAL_PES
-3.92
< 0.001
COMMUNITY
571.69
< 0.001
TOTAL_INCOME
621.26
< 0.001
PER_INC_PES
3.9
< 0.001
_CONS
Independent variables influencing whether or not the subject was willing to participate
in the proposed second PES program
-4.99
< 0.001
COMMUNITY
10.13
< 0.001
CARGO
-10.13
< 0.001
COFFEEHA
10.13
< 0.001
PAYENOUGH
10.13
< 0.001
ECONIMPROVE
10.13
< 0.001
WORTHRESTRICT
4.16
< 0.001
_CONS
Log Likelihood -441.4741 wald chi2(6) = 1.14E+07
LR test of ind. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)=11.03 prob> chi2 = 0.0000
the household income and the greater the amount of income came from government
programs the more the respondent asked for WTA. The inhabitants of Santa Cruz had
higher WTAs than those of San Pedro. In this model the factors influencing whether or
not the respondent would be willing to receive payment for expanding conservation into
coffee fields were the community, whether or not the head of household has held
leadership positions, the number of hectares the household has in coffee, whether the
respondent feels that what they receive for PSAH is enough, if they feel their economic
situation has improved and if the PSAH is worth the restrictions. Respondents from
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Santa Cruz are more likely to accept payment for expanding conservation into coffee
plots than those in San Pedro. Those who have had positions of leadership, who feel that
the PSAH pays well, feel that their economic situation has improved and believe the
PSAH is worth the restrictions on the forest are most likely to accept expansion of
conservation into coffee fields. The respondents from households with fewer hectares of
coffee were more willing to accept payments for expanding conservation into coffee
plots. With these factors as predictors, the predicted mean response for WTA was
M$1,708.24/ha/year compared to the actual mean of 3,714.13 pesos per hectare per year
(Table 4.5b).
Table 4.5b: Predicted mean WTA for carbon payments for land in coffee plots
from the first Heckman Selection Model
variable
Observations Mean
Std
Min
Max
deviation
COFFEE_M1 87
1708.238
2491.029
-3030.531
5770.284
(134.19)
When household size and non-coffee crop income were added to the model
several of these factors changed (Table 4.6a). Whether or not a household receives
remittance loses some significance for how much the respondent was willing to accept.
Surprisingly, adding these additional factors into the model made whether or not the
respondent thought the payments were worth the restrictions on the forest a much less
significant determinant of whether or not they would be willing to accept payment to
plant trees for carbon sequestration into their coffee plots. I investigated this factor
because household size can affect both how much money the household receives if there
are multiple adults in the household and also the costs of the household if there are many
children.
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Table 4.6a: Heckman selection Model Results: willingness to accept carbon
payments for land in coffee plots with household size and income from non-coffee
crops. (Dependent variables: WTA_COFFEE, WTA_COFFEE_YESNO)
Number of observations=68
variable
Z score
p > |z|
Independent variables influencing the amount the subject was willing to accept for a
second PES program on land in coffee plots
GENDER
2.93
0.003
REMITTANCE
-1.79
0.074
TOTAL_PES
-2.06
0.039
COMMUNITY
-3.82
< 0.001
TOTAL_INCOME
2.05
0.041
PER_INC_GOV
2.72
0.006
RESIDENTS
-.35
0.726
_CONS
3.42
0.001
Independent variables influencing whether or not the subject was willing to participate
in the proposed second PES program
COMMUNITY
-4.78
< 0.001
CARGO
3.75
< 0.001
COFFEEHA
-4.80
< 0.001
PAYENOUGH
7.76
< 0.001
ECONIMPROVE
3.86
< 0.001
WORTHRESTRICT
1.39
0.765
CROPTOTAL
-0.75
0.450
_CONS
3.41
0.001
Log Likelihood -441.4155 wald chi2(6) = 1.23E+07
LR test of ind. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)=11.03 prob> chi2 = 0.0000
Using this model the predicted mean response was 1,709.88 pesos per hectare
per year (Table 4.6b).
Table 4.6b: Predicted mean WTA for carbon payments for land in coffee plots with
household size and income from non coffee crops, from the second Heckman
Selection Model
variable
Observations Mean
Std
Min
Max
deviation
COFFEE_M2 87
1709.883
2481.663
-3033.063
5791.791
(134.32)
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I also wanted to take into account non-agricultural income and the number of
adults in a house. I added into the model the households other income which meant any
income unaccounted for at other points in the survey (Table 4.7a). This is income that is
not from remittances, agriculture or government programs, all of which have already
been considered in the model.
Table 4.7a: Heckman selection Model Results: willingness to accept carbon
payments for land in coffee plots with non-agricultural income and number of adults
residing in the house (Dependent variable WTA_COFFEE,
WTA_COFFEE_YESNO)
Number of observations=68
variable
Z score
p > |z|
Independent variables influencing the amount the subject was willing to accept for a
second PES program on land in coffee plots
GENDER
3.01
0.003
REMITTANCE
-1.67
0.96
TOTAL_PES
-3.17
0.002
COMMUNITY
-3.73
< 0.001
TOTAL_INCOME
1.36
0.173
PER_INC_PES
2.40
0.016
OTHERINCOME
0.03
0.973
ADULTS
-0.16
0.873
_CONS
3.17
0.002
Independent variables influencing whether or not the subject was willing to
participate in the proposed second PES program
COMMUNITY
-4.88
< 0.001
CARGO
1.79
0.073
COFFEEHA
-2.45
0.014
PAYENOUGH
3.58
< 0.001
ECONIMPROVE
2.27
0.023
WORTHRESTRICT
1.35
0.178
_CONS
3.38
0.001
Log Likelihood -441.4608 wald chi2(6) = 1.37E+07
LR test of ind. Eqns. (rho=0): chi2(1)=11.03 prob> chi2 = 0.0000
I found that there was no significant effect of non-agricultural income on the
WTA of respondents. Because most adults receive money from the PSAH the number of
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adults in the household affects the amount of money received. However, the number of
adults in a house did not significantly affect the stated WTA of a respondent. Adding
these factors to the regressions changed the significance of the total income and whether
or not the PSAH payments are worth the restrictions.

This model predicted the

responses of the respondents and found a mean of 1685.65 pesos per hectare per year
(4.7b).
Table 4.7b: Predicted mean WTA for carbon payments for land in coffee plots with
agricultural income and number of adults residing in house from the third Heckman
Selection Model
variable
Observations
Mean
Std
Min
Max
deviation
Coffee_M3
87
1685.653
2500.823
-2929.827
5660.698
(132.42)
Willingness to Accept payments for expanding conservation into coffee plots
elicited responses between 50 and 10,000 pesos per hectare per year (Figure 4.2). The
mean response was 3,714.13 pesos with the expected response of 1708.24 pesos. The
median response was 3000 pesos.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT – CARBON PAYMENTS IN BRACKEN FERN
Because of the invasive species problem in San Pedro I asked respondents in San
Pedro if they would be willing to accept payments to expand conservation into the areas
with bracken fern. Of the twenty nine individuals surveyed in San Pedro, twelve were
willing to give a price for what they would be willing to accept to expand conservation to
areas with bracken fern. Those who refused to respond did so either because they were
not interested in such a program or because they were simply tired of the survey and
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refused to continue. Those who were not interested in the program stated either that it
would be impossible or too difficult to reforest the areas with bracken fern. Those who
named a price mostly indicated a very high WTA, a reflection of how work intensive a
bracken fern removal and restoration project would be for the community.

Frequency

Figure 4.2: Distribution of WTA, coffee: Distribution of responses for willingness
to accept payments for carbon payments for land in coffee plots
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SUMMARY
They results of all three WTA questions and the prediction models are shown in
table 4.8 below. This is compared with opportunity cost, which was determined by
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taking the household income from coffee and dividing it by the number of hectares of
coffee owned by members of the household, and also with the total income from coffee
during the study year of July 2009 to July 2010. It is clear that willingness to accept is
lowest for programs within the existing conservation area, higher for programs that
would require giving up coffee income and the highest for programs that would require
reforestation of areas covered by bracken fern. Opportunity cost is lower than WTA in
all cases but coffee income is higher than WTA per hectare to abandon coffee plots for
the purpose of tree plantations for carbon sequestration.
Table 4.8: Summary of WTA with predicted values
Obs
Mean
Std dev
Min

Variable
WTA_CONS
CONS_M1
CONS_M2
CONS_M3
WTA_COFFEE
COFFEE_M1
COFFEE_M2
COFFEE_M3
WTA_BRACKEN
OPPORTUNITY
COFFEETOTAL

69
73
73
73
46
87
87
87
12
87
88

1180.87 (92.76)
1395.85 (109.65)
1397.11 (109.75)
1383.81 (108.70)
3714.13 (291.76)
1708.24 (134.19)
1709.88 (134.32)
1685.65 (132.42)
193654.50 (15212.45)
986.68 (77.51)
2108.37 (165.62)

1518.05
936.21
946.85
945.768
2647.86
2491.03
2481.66
2500.82
428674.90
1282.27
24000.00

150
93.83
-27.51
-149.34
50.00
-3030.53
-3033.06
-2929.83
800
0.00
0.00

max
8000
3670.96
3758.90
3776.83
10000.00
5770.28
5791.79
5660.70
1,200,000
6000.00
24000.00

A two sample T-test with unequal variances shows that WTA_CONS and WTA
COFFEE are significantly different from one another (t=-5.8768, d.f. = 64.8222, p<0.01)
meaning that subjects were willing to accept less where there was less personal loss or
work involved by participating in a program within the conservation area rather than one
in which coffee fields would be changed into tree plantations.
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Table 4.9: Summary of WTA by community
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std dev
WTA_CONS (Santa Cruz)
51
1174.118
1602.098
(92.23)
WTA_CONS (San Pedro)
18
1200
1291.602
(94.27)
WTA_COFFEE (Santa Cruz)
43
3856.977
2680.986
(302.98)
WTA_COFFEE (San Pedro)
3
1666.667
288.6751
(130.92)

Min
150

max
8000

400

5000

50

10000

1500

2000

Table 4.9 compares WTA between communities. Both communities gave similar
responses for WTA_CONSERVATION (Mann-Whitney test, z=-0.806, p=0.4202).
Because of the small number of observations made for willingness to accept for the
expansion of conservation into coffee plots for San Pedro, I could not determine if the
WTA in San Pedro was significantly different than WTA in Santa Cruz. However, when
comparing response rates between the two communities, respondents in Santa Cruz were
more likely to be willing to accept payment for the expansion of conservation into coffee
plots (43 out of 58) than those in San Pedro (3 out of 29) (Mann-Whitney, z= 4.511,
p=0.01).
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CHAPTER V – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter V will synthesize the results from this study and put it into context with
other case studies within the literature of Payments for Environmental Services. In the
next few pages I will explain the impact the payments from the PSAH program has had at
the household level and the potential of poverty alleviation in the community. Next I will
discuss the PSAH and the effects it has had on social capital within and between the
communities. I will then discuss the participants’ satisfaction with the program and how
it has been functioning in the community and their willingness to accept for additional
programs. Finally I will use my example presented here to discuss whether PES can be a
valuable tool for conservation and poverty alleviation and address some of the common
critiques of PES programs and how they are dealt with in the PSAH in my common
property regime example.

COMMUNITY ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PSAH
Several of the variables measured during the household survey can be used to
determine community attitude towards the PSAH program, whether they agreed with the
distribution scheme of the funds, whether or not they thought community members
received funds in an equitable fashion and whether or not they thought that participation
was worth the restrictions on the forest. The variable measuring perceived economic
improvement can also be used but will be discussed in detail in the section on household
impact and poverty alleviation. Eighty two percent of the respondents to the household
survey agreed with the distribution schemes used, eighty five percent thought that
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community members receive equitable amounts from the fund, eighty four percent
believed themselves to be economically better off because of the payments, and seventy
two percent thought the payments were worth the restrictions on the forest.

The

distribution scheme used in the community and the amount received by each individual
community member is determined communally and voted on by the assembly. A positive
attitude towards these two aspects shows the success and strength of social capital in
making community decisions. The percentage who feel the payments are worth the
restrictions is high, indicating again strong social capital in order to make community
decisions on land use that are acceptable to the majority, but the percentage is lower. The
lower agreement might be a result of the respondent thinking the community should be
paid more money, only 21.3% of the respondents think that the amount CONAFOR pays
is enough. Many of the land use restrictions are imposed by the community itself but
how much the community receives in compensation is an external decision made without
collective action and trust with the community.

The decision to participate in the

program, however, is a communal decision. This may explain the slightly lower, but still
high, positive attitude towards compensation for restrictions on land use.

HOUSEHOLD IMPACT AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
Without the income from the PSAH both communities fall below at least one of
the three levels of poverty defined by SEDESOL (2002). As Table 3.4 shows, mean
income per person per day without including funds from PSAH in Santa Cruz is 20.43
pesos which is below the level of asset poverty. In San Pedro mean income per person
per day is 11.2 pesos which is below all three levels of poverty. With the income from
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the PSAH Santa Cruz is well above all three defined levels of poverty with 32.5 pesos per
person per day and San Pedro is slightly above capability poverty with 18.97 pesos per
person per day but still below asset poverty. The difference between communities could
be a result of larger household sized in San Pedro which has an average of 5.38 residents
per house to Santa Cruz’s 3.62 residents per house. Also, in Santa Cruz, there is a greater
opportunity for diversification of income as a result of the road connecting Santa Cruz to
potential markets, sources of employment and educational opportunities. In Santa Cruz
the addition of money from the PSAH was enough to lift them out of asset poverty to a
point in which they no longer meet the federal definition of poor. In San Pedro the
addition of the PSAH was enough to lift them out of nutritional poverty and capability
poverty into the lowest level, asset poverty.
It is worth mentioning that the measurement of household income in Santa Cruz
may be more accurate than those from San Pedro. During the course of the field research
I spent more time in Santa Cruz and was able to interact more with leaders and
community members. My time in San Pedro was limited to ten days. In ten days I was
less able to create relationships with community members and communication was more
difficult because fewer adults spoke Spanish in San Pedro than Santa Cruz. In this way I
was limited in the trust I was able to create in San Pedro compared to Santa Cruz where I
was better known and possibly considered more trustworthy. I suspect that the results
reflect truth and that the people in Santa Cruz do indeed have higher incomes per person
than in San Pedro because of the factors I have already mentioned, but I suspect that the
incomes in San Pedro are higher than what was reported.
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On the individual household level, these results show that there have been welfare
improvements. In 84% of the surveys the subjects indicated that their economic situation
had improved as a result of receiving the PSAH funds. The most commonly reported
uses of the money were medical costs, home improvements, food and general household
costs (Figure 3.8). In addition, 44% of those surveyed have been able to ask for money
from the community fund in the case of an emergency. In Santa Cruz this means taking
one’s own funds from the community savings account and in San Pedro taking money
from the community fund is an interest free loan from the portion of the funds for
community use. This indicates that the reason people are better off is that they have more
diverse diets, better homes and improved health and access to medical care.
I suspect that some of the benefits of the PSAH will become more apparent in the
future. Already, participation has resulted in more knowledge among the community
leaders about government and NGO programs and possibilities. Participation in the
PSAH has given the communities and the leaders experience traveling to other places,
interacting in meeting and seminar situation and dealing with paperwork and funding.
Experiences such as these may open up opportunities to participate in other programs and
to search out other investments and opportunities. As part of the distribution laid out by
CORENCHI and adapted by the communities (Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4) scholarships can
be given to students who wish to study beyond what is offered in the community. With
the ability to rely on conservation payments, children are free to pursue education
because there is less demand for agricultural labor. Time for education may result in the
future in a more educated and connected population in the communities which will open
up additional opportunities. Having educated children working in the cities is also a
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social security option for older community members, allowing them to work less land in
their old age which may open up more land for conversion to forest. The communities
have only been involved in the PSAH since 2004, six years at the time of the study,
which may be too short term to see some of the long term benefits that may arise.
As was discussed in the introduction, PES has the potential to alleviate poverty as
long as the poor have access to the programs (Wunder 2008, Pagiola et al. 2005, LandellMills and Porras 2002). The first barrier to participation by the poor is eligibility.
Eligibility comes in the form of location in a target area. The land within the PSAH has
tropical montane cloud forest (TMCF) as the major vegetation type and TMCFs are
favored by the PSAH program in terms of targeting for hydrologic benefits. The second
barrier is whether or not the poor want to participate. Previous to participation in the
PSAH both Santa Cruz and San Pedro had forest that they were not exploiting for lumber
or agriculture and Santa Cruz had actively decided not to log their forests after the road
reached the town. Therefore, there was no more profitable land use that the communities
were deciding between and payments for the conservation they were already practicing
was welcome. Trust in the buyer or intermediary may also influence the poor’s desire to
participate and the program was introduced to the communities by a NGO,
Geoconservación, with which they had experience.
The third barrier to poor participation in PES is ability to participate. Ability may
be limited by high transaction costs, land tenure and access to technical assistance. The
communities in my study have legal land tenure over their territory. Technical assistance
is provided in part by CONAFOR to the participating communities. Currently the NGO
Global Diversity Fund has field agents who are working with the communities to create
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management plans for the land under the PSAH, a new requirement of the PSAH
program. Transaction costs of participation were not negligible. The community leaders
had to travel to Oaxaca and Tuxtepec, the two closest cities, in order to attend meetings,
meet with officials and sign paperwork. Now that the community is receiving payments
there are funds which help the leaders pay for these trips. Before entering the program,
the trips were paid for by contributions from the community.

If the individual

community members had to fund these trips themselves it would have made them unable
to participate, the cost would have been too high. With every member of the community
contributing the cost was spread out and was manageable. The ability to share the
transaction cost is a result of the social structure of the community and allows them to
overcome one of the most common barriers to poor participation.
Muradian et al. (2009) suggest that the PES may take advantage of the poor. For
one, the willingness to accept of the poor may be so low that their participation could be
considered only questioningly voluntary. Muradian et al. (2009) also suggest that there
would be equity problems with poor participation in PES as, due to lower opportunity
costs, their willingness to accept would be lower than wealthier land owners and thus the
poor could be paid less for the same service. This is clearly not the case in my study.
Though I do not have WTA data from wealthier land owners, the WTA for carbon
payments stated by the participants in my study is well over what they have been offered
for hydrological services and well above the market price for carbon. I believe this to be
a result of collective participation within the community, between communities in the
form of CORENCHI and between the community and CORENCHI leaders and delegates
from CONAFOR and Geoconservación. Community members have confidence because
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of the social capital and collective action that has been built and utilized during the last
six years of participation in the PSAH that they know their forests are valuable, unique
and worth something to others.
Whether or not the PSAH will alleviate poverty in these two communities, I think,
is yet to be seen. It is clear that there has been an improvement in standard of living in
many ways and that the communities have risen above some of the federal poverty lines,
in the case of San Pedro, and above the federal definition of poverty in the case of Santa
Cruz. However, the PSAH is not guaranteed indefinitely and unless the communities can
make investments or find new programs which will continue to pay for conservation,
when the PSAH program ends the benefits will end with it.

TRUST, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND GOVERNANCE
The internal governance of Santa Cruz and San Pedro serves to reduce or even
eliminate the problems of free riders and corruption, due to strict monitoring and
enforcement of community rules, enhancing their ability to commonly manage the
resources of the forest and the money that comes from conservation. Experimental
evidence shows that collective management of resources is possible when there is
evidence of cooperation and when there is enforcement of cooperation even when this
enforcement comes at a personal cost (Ostrom 2000, Rustagi et al. 2010).

In the

communities of this study, cooperation is required in order to benefit from the PSAH
payments and those who do not cooperate do not benefit. Monitoring of cooperation and
sanction of not only free riders but those who cheat the system is prevalent in both
communities.
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In Santa Cruz, there was a recent example of a leader who stole money from the
community. This individual was stripped of their leadership position and required to pay
back the funds.

In San Pedro we saw one instance of an individual rejecting the

leadership position assigned to them and the result of that refusal which is that he and his
family do not receive payments from the PSAH money. Also, in San Pedro, payment
receipt is conditional on participation in community work days. This enforcement is
based on internal regulations and is enforced by the chosen leadership and the individuals
in the community. Holding leadership positions is personally costly, particularly now
that the communities are involved in the PSAH program. Because of participation in
PSAH, there are more meetings and more traveling required of the leaders which means
that they have less time to work in their own matters, such as corn, coffee or their small
businesses. Thus, participation in the monitoring and enforcement and regulation of the
common resource of payment for forest conservation is personally costly but happens
anyway. According to Rustagi et al. (2010) this is an indication of a high number of
conditional cooperators, people who are willing to cooperate if they are assured that
others will cooperate, in the population and shows the emergence of a culture that
enforces cooperation. Cooperative will in conservation might increase as well as it
becomes apparent that working cooperatively results in benefits to the community in the
form of conservation payments.
The decision making institution in Santa Cruz and San Pedro is one reason that
social capital is strong and collective action possible.
Assembly.

Decisions are made by the

As described previously, the Assembly is made up of all the legally

recognized community members, or comuneros.
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Whenever necessary, meetings are

called and the Assembly gathers in the community center. Issues are discussed and a
vote is taken. Decisions in the community are made by simple majority and by secret
ballot. If 100 comuneros are present and 51 vote in favor of something, it will be
accepted. In my interviews, when I asked if there were people opposed to participation in
the PSAH the informant usually replied that there were a few who opposed but it did not
matter because the majority was in favor. The majority of survey respondents aree with
the way the money is used in the community as this is a decision made by the Assembly.
The Assembly meetings are called whenever necessary and will last as long as required to
address the issues at hand. While I was in the community conducting this study a
meeting of the Assembly was called to elect the new round of leaders and the meeting
lasted for three days from nine in the morning to six at night. Attendance of Assembly
meetings is mandatory. Those who are absent must send an adult representative from
their household or pay a fine, one more example of monitoring and sanctioning of
community rules.
One place where social capital, collective action and democracy are weak is in the
participation by women. Women are generally not legal community members except in
the case of single mothers, women whose husbands are working and living outside of the
community and widows. This limitation comes from agrarian law which only recognized
the head of household as legal members of comunidades or ejidos. In the rare cases that a
woman is the listed comunera and her husband is not, her husband is the one who attends
the Assembly meetings in her place. Single women who are comuneras are not expected
to attend Assemblies but to send a male representative in her place. Those who do attend
are in the minority. In this way, the female voice is not heard at the assemblies. The
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results of this were seen in some of the responses in the structured survey. Two women
who were interviewed expressed displeasure that the PSAH payments were given to their
husbands in its entirety even though half of the money was theirs.

One woman

mentioned that there should be more community money invested into the schools and the
health center, two aspects of the community that are traditionally of most concern to
women.
Social Capital, trust and collective action has been strong within the communities
and this has allowed the PSAH to be successfully implemented in the communities.
However, collective action was needed between the communities in the form of
CORENCHI in order to attract the attention necessary to gain access to the PSAH and
trust and social capital has not always been strong between communities.

The

communities of CORENCHI share territorial boundaries and in the past there has been
disputed over the boundaries. This led to occasional violence between the communities
and a lack of trust. When it became clear that forming an alliance between communities
would be important for obtaining conservation payments, the communities had to come
together and develop trust and communication between them. The successful formation
of CORENCHI, frequent meetings and even that more people intermarry between
communities is evidence that this trust was built and is being maintained.
Vatn (2009) explored the use of payments for environmental services programs as
a tool for strengthening collective action by strengthening land tenure and requiring
individual land owners to group together in order to offer parcels of land which are large
enough to provide the desired watershed service. Programs such as RUPES in several
Asian countries, Pimampiro in Ecuador and Proambiente in Ecuador attempt to organize
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land owners in this way to take advantage of PES programs with varying success (Huang
et al. 2007, Kerr 2002, Southgate and Wunder 2009). In Mexico, the program of PSAH
started with strong community level governance and institutions and clearly defined land
tenure. My two communities were able to use their strong land tenure and common
property regime to successfully access the PSAH program. Rather than joining together
unrelated land owners with no previous relationship, within the communities all land is
communal and they joined together communities with similar cultural backgrounds and
similar governance structures.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT
The responses for willingness to accept payment for carbon programs was
different depending on whether the project would be within the conservation areas or in
the coffee plots. From Figures 4.1 and 4.2 it is evident that WTA responses were
clustered towards lower numbers where WTA in coffee fields responses were more
spread out and were higher. Differences in responses between respondents may be
because different individuals have different opportunity costs. The opportunity costs for
the community as a whole may be low, but if an individual feels they have lost important
resources from the forest or it they had interests in logging of cattle, their perceived
opportunity cost will be higher than that of the community as a whole. The average of
WTA for coffee plots was higher than the average for conservation in both the actual data
and the predicted responses (Table 4.8). A carbon program in the conservation area is a
proposal that is not unfamiliar as the communities already have experience with water
payments in the conservation area. An Additional PES program within the conservation
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area would not be much additional work for the community nor represent a personal loss
for the survey respondents. A carbon program that would require cutting down coffee
plants and planting forest trees represents a loss and a risk for the individual respondent.
There is also a difference between community property and property which is claimed by
an individual.

between communal and private property. The conservation area is

communal, the costs and benefits of the program would be shared by all the community
members, while coffee plots are the closest to private property that exists in the
communities. The costs and benefits of participating in a carbon program in the coffee
plots would fall primarily on the owners of the parcels.
A second main difference between WTA for carbon capture PES in the
conservation area and carbon capture PES in coffee plots was the response rate of the
survey respondents. Most of the respondents, 87.8%, were interested in participating in a
carbon capture program in the conservation are while only 67.14% were interested in
participating if the program was in the coffee plots. If separated by community, In Santa
Cruz 51 of the 59 people interviewed were willing to participate in the program in the
conservation area while 43 of the 59 were willing if the program is in coffee fields.
Those numbers were 18 of 29 for conservation and only 3 out of 29 for coffee in San
Pedro. That means that 73% of those surveyed in Santa Cruz were willing to abandon
coffee production in return for carbon payments but only 10% were willing to do so in
San Pedro. In San Pedro I was often told that they were unwilling to give up their coffee
fields because growing coffee is what they do. They also use coffee fields to grow other
food crops for consumption or sale, such as tepejilote or guasmol and collect firewood
from the plots. The people in San Pedro have less land in their agricultural zone to begin
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with because so much of it is covered with bracken fern and already many community
members have to walk an hour or more to reach their fields. Additionally limiting their
access to land to grow food is not something most members of San Pedro were willing to
consider. There was no price that they would accept to give up that source of livelihood
and security. These results show a difference in willingness to participate not only
between communal and private land, but also between individuals with different risk
acceptance abilities. Those who rely more on the coffee are less likely to take the risk of
accepting payments for payments for an activity other than coffee.
The authors of the Southgate et al. (2009) study found that farmers with
successful crops were less willing to forgo agricultural land or would require a higher
payment to do so. My study obtained similar results. As seen in table 4.5a, the less land
a household had in coffee production, the more willing they were to want to participate in
a program for carbon capture in coffee fields. Having less land in coffee may indicate
less of a dependence on that crop and other uses on that land for their livelihoods.
Additionally, if a family receives remittance income, they are willing to accept a smaller
payment. Because the household receives this additional income, they are able to take
more risk. Also, the more that a household receives in PES now, a function of the
number of adults living in the house, the lower their WTA, which indicated that they are
satisfied with what they are receiving and do not feel the need to get more. The higher
the total income in the house the higher their WTA which is possibly a reflection of
income generated by a combination of coffee and other crops grown on coffee land, such
as tepejilote and guasmol, which can be sold for profit. In this way my results are
similar to those of Southgate et al. (2009) in that those who have the most to lose, or the
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highest opportunity cost in terms of land owned and income from that land, by
participation demand the most payments.
Whether or not respondents were willing to participate in a carbon capture
program in the conservation are and what they would be willing to accept was largely
based on factors involving perception of the current PSAH program. If the respondent
feels their economic situation had improved, they were more willing to participate in a
second program. If the respondent was told the current market price for carbon, at the
time of the study it was estimated to be 200 pesos per hectare of tropical forest, they were
willing to accept a smaller payment than if they were not explained the market price.
Explaining carbon prices had no influence on the WTA for a program in the coffee fields
where income and opportunity cost factors were more important. If the respondent had
used money from the fund, by asking for their saved money in Santa Cruz or requesting a
loan in San Pedro, they reported higher willingness to accept. Using the fund may reflect
larger needs in the form of medical costs and thus desire for higher payments. Two
results that are difficult to explain are that agreement with the distribution of funds and
whether or not they thought community members received money equally were
negatively correlated with whether they would be willing to participate and what they
would be willing to accept respectively. It is possible that if a respondent thought that
not everyone in the community received their fair share of the PSAH money that
receiving more money would help fix the problem, but those who are not in agreement
with the distributions shown in figures 3.3 and 3.4 would want to participate in a new
program more than those who are in agreement is difficult to explain.
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The responses given in San Pedro for willingness to accept a carbon payment for
tree planting projects in areas covered by bracken fern show that this project would come
at a higher cost to the community than the others. The mean response was 193,654.50
pesos with a minimum of 800 pesos and a maximum of 1,200,000 pesos per hectare per
year. Clearly this price is more than would be feasible indicating that a program to
reforest the bracken fern areas is not feasible.
The prices given by the respondents of the survey are generally much higher than
the market price of carbon and higher than what is being offered by current government
programs, such as the PSAH program. In order to avoid this in future studies I would
design the questions to be more similar to the questions of Southgate et al. (2009) which
provided respondents with several different amounts and asked if they would be willing
to accept each of them. In this way I could avoid receiving responses which are above
what might ever be offered and determine if the communities would be willing to
participate in programs at prices that are likely to be offered.

CRITIQUES OF PES
One common critique of PES programs is of equity and efficiency. Generally it is
thought that in order to target the poor, efficiency must be sacrificed, and in order to be
efficient targeting should be towards hydrologicaly important areas regardless of the
income of the owner of the territory (Pagiola et al. 2010). The poor may have lower
willingness to accept because they have lower opportunity costs and cannot refuse even
the smallest of payments (Muradian et al. 2009). In Mexico there is the unique situation
of the land tenure of ejidos and comunidades in which the poor actually have strong
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tenure rights over large areas of land. In addition, the land owned by Santa Cruz and San
Pedro is within the Papaloapan watershed, one of the largest watersheds in Mexico, and
one of the main vegetation types in the program area is Tropical Montane Cloud Forest
which is particularly favored by the PSAH program. There is little additionality because
the land in the program is also protected as a community conserved area and at very low
risk of deforestation. Many of the behavior changes in the communities in terms of use
of the forest resources have been self imposed and not imposed by participation in the
PSAH. The money being received is not a reason to change behavior, but rather a reward
for what they have been doing. Santa Cruz has decided not to log the forest for profit but
opinion within the community may change on that issue. A behavior change might come
from the payments from the PSAH and any other opportunities that come from it if they
sway them away from logging again in the future.
The definitions for PES defined by Muradian et al. (2009) and Sommerville et al.
(2009) are better descriptions of the PSAH, particularly in my communities, than the
Wunder (2005) five-point definition. Rather than a direct transaction between user and
buyer, as in the Wunder (2005) definition, the PSAH is a transfer of resources from the
government to the communities with the intention that they continue the protection of
their forests for the purpose of providing the assumed hydrological benefits from the
forests. This is a much closer fit to the definitions from Muradian et al. (2009) and
Sommerville et al. (2009) presented on page 9 of chapter one.
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CONCLUSIONS

Returning to my title question, “do payments for hydrological services reduce
poverty and strengthen social capital?” for my two study communities it appears that the
answer to both questions is strongly in the affirmative. If poverty alleviation is defined
by raising incomes above the national poverty line then it is shown that in Santa Cruz this
has happened and in San Pedro the incomes have risen above two of the three levels of
poverty. In addition, community members believe themselves to be better off than before
participating in the program and quality of life may have improved in the form of more
diverse diets, better access to health care and more secure housing. Some indirect
benefits of participation in the PSAH program may be delayed, such as better education
and results of investments made with the new availability of financial capital. Social
Capital existed in the communities before the arrival of the PSAH and certainly was
influential in the communities’ ability to access the program. In addition the money from
the PSAH has reaffirmed the communities’ faith in community leaders who had been
advocating conservation and necessitated an increase in communication and trust
between the communities who are part of CORENCHI. These results are unique to the
community property regime found in the community.

Equitable distributions of

resources resulting in both an improvement in wellbeing and strengthening of the social
institutions which determine it is a result of the communal decision making and
mandatory and voluntary governance structure and built in enforcement. In this way,
poverty has been alleviated and social capital strengthened in the study communities.

134

In addition, this study illustrated in interesting difference in willingness to accept
for conservation payments on communal land and private property. On land that is
communally owned and managed by community rules, willingness to accept is less. On
private land where the costs of participation are born by individuals and represents a
greater risk for the individual, willingness to accept is more.
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Appendix I – Structured Survey, English
Structured Household Survey for the Project: Sustainable landscapes in the Chinantla: Payments for
Hydrological Services and the Abandonment of Coffee

Name of Interviewer
Lindsey
1
Ernesto
2
Emily
3
Otro
4
______________________

Date of the Survey

Guide:

Protocol: 1) make appointments in the houses 2)ask for the head of the house 3) if the head of the house is not home, do the
interview with the spouse or elder child.
Introduction:
Good afternoon. My name is _______Soy part of a research team of IDRC-Oaxaca and Florida International University in the
United States. We are working with Elvira Duran and David Bray. We are looking at the emigration of the community, coffee,
and payments for watershed services received by the community. This should take one hour of your time. We have the
commissioner's permission to do research in the community. All data and information that you give me during the survey will
serve as part of my study only and are completely confidential. If you decide to participate in the study he makes a series of
questions hoping that their answers are as complete as possible because the data that we collect could serve the community.
May I continue?
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Community :_______________________________
(SCT – Santa Cruz Tepetotutla; SPT – San Pedro Tlatepusco)

1.6 What positions have you held in
the comisariado?

Section 1 –Demography of the House

1

1.1 Head of Household

2

1.2 Name___________________________ 1.3 Gender

M_____F______
3

1.4 Age ___________________

1.5 civil state ______________
4

Home Information:
1.7 Type of floor:

____ dirt

____ cement . ____ clay

____ tile

____ other (Which?_______________)

1.8 principal material of walls:
___ brick

___ wood ____ sticks and leaves

____adobe

____ cement

1.9 Material of the roof: ___ tin ____ tile _____ leaves
1.10 ¿how many rooms in the house? _______

1.11 ¿what type of bathroom?:
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____flushing toilet

____ rustic latrine

____ dry latrine

____ none

Box 1.12 1.12 Now I will ask you questions about the people who actually live in the house
First, can you tell me how many people live in the house? _____
No. a) Name
b) Relationship to head of c) Age
d) Education level
household
Head ……………….………1
Spouse………….………….2
child..………...…………….3
Sibling……………………..4
Grandparent.………………..5
Aunt or uncle…….…………6
Cousin(m)…………………..7
parent in law..........................8
parent………. . . . . …….….9
son in law………..………...10
daughter in law…………….11
cousin (f).…………………12
other family……………….13
no relation….……………..14

1

1

2

2

Preschool . . . . . ..1
Primary 1-3…..…2
Primary 4-6.…….3
Secondary………4
Prep ……..……..5
Undergraduate…6
Did not attend….7
Other...……………8

e) Did you
immigrate
for a time to
the US?
Yes/No

f) ¿DO you
contribute
Money to
the
household?
Yes or No

Which?

Yes

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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1.13 How many children do you have in total? ______
1.13a of those, how many live in the house?
_______________
1.13b how many live in the community? ______________ 1.13c how many live outside the community?_________
1.13f how many have died? _______

Section 2 – People who contribute money to the house
Now I would like to ask a few questions about the income that comes into the house.
2.1 Do you receive Mmoney sent by someone who is outside of the house?
Yes____ No___
Box 2.2 Family members who send money.
a) Name

b) Where are
they?

c) ¿have they d) ¿How often do
send Money
they send money?
in the last 12
months?
(yes/no)

1
2
3
4
5
6
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e) ¿What quantity do they
send each time?

f) calculation

Agricultural Activities. Now I will ask about your agricultural activities.
Café
2.3 How many hectares of coffee do the members of the household have? _____ In how many parcels? _______ (probe for
old abandoned plots that they may not remember)
2.4 Did you sell coffee last year? Si___ No___
2.5 What was your total production in kilos last year?_________ kilos
2.5a ¿who did you sell to?

1)

Coffee Cooperative

2)

Coyote

3)

Other:

b) ¿how many kilos?

c) ¿what did they
pay for the kilo?

d) ¿how much did they
pay in total?

e) Kilos x Price
=

Box 2.6: Active coffee Emily’s questions
Parcel a) Where is b) Cuantas vezes lo limpia
it?
ud cada ano
1 vez........1
2 veces....2

c) Qué tipo de
d) Has metido
café
otros plantes en
Orgánico.....1
su cafetal?
Convencional...2

1
2
3
4
5
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e) Cual plantes?
Frutales..........1
Maíz............2
Frijoles........3
Otro.............4

f) Se lo
tumbo?
Si.....1
No.....2

g) Si, Cuando lo
tumbo?
(año, más o menos)

Box 2.7: Café inactivo
Parcela a) Donde esta?

b) Actividad de la c) Cuando se d)
e) Agricultura
parcela.
abandono? Actividades. anual.
Maíz....1
Abandono
Leña....1
Yuca....2
Puro........1
Ganado. . . Otro....3
Transformada a
2
un policultivo....2
Otro . . . . 3
Agricultura
anual......3
otro................4

g) ( si la
respuesta fue a)
Cuando se
Precio......1
abandono,
Emigración...2 alguien emigro
de la casa para
Infestación . . .3
trabajar afuera?
Otro......4
Si/ No
f) Por qué se
abandono?

1
2
3
4
5
6

2.8 ¿Antes de sembrar café, que sembraba en cada parcela? __________________ 2.9 ¿En qué ano sembró café?
_____________
2.10 ¿Sembró arboles de sombra? Si ___ No ____
usted?_______________________

2.10a ¿Qué tipo de arboles de sombra sembró
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h) Ud.
piensa
tumbara en
algún
momento?

Si....1

______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______
2.10b ¿Qué porcentaje de sombra tenía en sus parcelas (mención INMECAFE)?
___________________________________________

Maíz (Ernesto’s questions)
2.11 ¿How many hectares of corn do the people in the house have? ________2.11a ¿En qué tantas parceles? _______
2.12 Cuantos se rindió en kilos por hectárea el año pasado? ______
2.13 ¿Usted ha perdido un área para cultivo de maíz por acuerdo comunitario? Si ___ No ____
2.13a ¿Dónde estaba? ____________________ 2.13b ¿Qué tantas hectáreas? _______ 2.13c ¿En qué año fue perdido?
__________
2.13d ¿Usted podría encontrar otra área para cultivo de maíz? Si ____ No ____

Other products that you sold
2.14 ¿Other than coffee, do you have other products that you cultivate or collect that you also sell? Yes ___ No ___

2.14 a) Product/crop
(Guasmol, tepejilote, naranja,
plátano ect. . . .)
1)

b) ¿How much did you sell in the
last 12 months?

quantity

Unit of
measure

2)
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c) ¿what Price did you receive
per unit?

d) Calculation

3)

Cattle and yard animals
2.15 ¿Do you have any cattle? Yes ____ No _____
No____

2.15a ¿Did you sell any cattle in the last year? Yes ___

2.15b ¿Did you sell any other animal last year? Yes ___ No___
2.15c ¿What?

d) ¿How many?

e) ¿what price?

f) $ for the year

1
2
3

Work in other parcels
Box 2.16 ¿do you or anyone in the house work as a day laborer? Yes___ No ___
a) Name

b) ¿How much do you earn
per day?

c) ¿how many days did
you work in corn?

1
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d) ¿How many days did
you work in coffee?

e) $ for the year

2
3
4

Other Sources of Income

Now I would like to ask about other sources of income

2.17 Does anyone in the house have another source of income? Yes___ No ____
a) name

b) type of work

c) ¿how much do you earn per
day/week/month?

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

2.18 ¿other source of income? ___ Yes

___ No
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d) $ for the year

SECTION 3 – Sources of Income from Government Programs
3.1 Do you receive assistance from PROCAMPO? Yes_________No____________
3.1a How many hectares? __________________ (X 1300 = __________)
3.2 Do you receive assistance from OPPORTUNIDADES? Yes_____ No_______
_______
Can you tell me their names?
No. b) name of child
c) Gender
d) grade level
Male…………1
Female……….2

3.2a how many children receive?

e) amount
received

f) amount for the
year

1
2
3
4
5
3.2g do your receive the payment for the mother? Yes ___ No ____

3.2h ¿how much? _______/ dos meses

3.3 Does anyone in the house receive “SETENTA O MAS”? Yes ____ No ____
No. 3.3a Who?
1
2

3.3b how much?

3.4 Does anyone receive aid from temporary employment? (PET)? Yes___ No___
No 3.4a Who?
3.4b how often?
3.4c how much do they receive every
time?
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1
2
3

SECCION 4 - Non monetary aid
4.1 have you received a greenhouse? Yes ____ No ______

4.1a is it functioning now? Si ____ No _____

4.2 have you received an aquiculture project? Si ___ No ___

4.2a is it functioning now? Si ____ No _____

4.3 ¿Hay are there any other programs that have benefited you? yes ____ No _____
4.3a what are they?
4.3b Organization
1

4.3c Program

2
3
4
5
6

Section 5 – PSAH
Ahora quisiera hacerle unas preguntas sobre los pagos por servicios hidrológicos
5.1 Do you know why the community is receiving payments for hydrological services?
Yes____
No_____
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5.1 a why?

5.2 How many people in the house have money deposited in the bank from the PES? _____ (X 1500 = ________SCT / X
_____ = _____SPT)
5.3 When they distributed the entire fund from the bank, how much did you receive? (SCT) ____________
5.5a What is the most important thing you bought with the money?
5.5b. What is the second most important thing you did with the money?
5.4 How many people received a direct distribution of the money last year? ___ (X 500 = _____SCT / X _____ = ____SPT)
5.5 Is there an elder in the house who receives the payment? Si___ No ____ (X 200/mes = _____ SCT /
5.6 How have you used your money that is kept in the bank? (keep pressing them as they may have forgotten)
Use
1

a) How many times have you used the
money this way?
Medical costs

2 Household
improvements
3 Production activities
4 other
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b) How much have you used?

5.7 Do you know how many hectares are within the PSAH program? yes ___ No ____ 5.8a How many? ______
5.8 What are the restrictions on use of soil within the program?

5.9 Do you believe that the payments are distributed in an equal manner? Yes_____ No_____
5.10a Why?

5.10 Do you think that the payments for hydrological services are worth the restrictions that are placed on the forest for
conservation? yes____ No_____

5.11 Do you agree with the way that the payments are distributed? Si _____ No _____ 5.12a Why?

5.12 Has your economic situation improved because of the payments for environmental services? Yes____ No____
5.13a why?
5.13 Do you think that the 400 pesos per hectare per year that the government is paying are enough? Yes ___ No _____
5.13a If no . . . what is the least they should pay per hectare per year?
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Section 6 – Disposition to accept payments for carbon services**
Trees are very important not only for water supply, but also for the climate control by reducing carbon, a pollutant that is
causing climate change. In many parts of the world, governments and companies are paying landowners to plant trees or for
conservation. In this way buyers will earn about carbon credits to sell on the market.
6.1 - Would you be interested in participating in a program in which you would be paid to either plant trees or continue
conserving the forests with the end of removing carbon from the air?
Yes_____ No_______
Every other survey explain that the market price is more or less 200 pesos per hectare per year. Explain that by asking for less means
losing but to ask much more means that people can look elsewhere in the project. ___ explain___ Do not explain

6.2 -Now, , The community earns 400 pesos per hectare per year for the hydrological services. With this money the community pays for
the costs of the comisariado, the activities of natural resource conservation and you receive a payment. You have more than nine thousand
acres under conservation but only four thousand are in the program of payments for environmental services. Then there is no payment for
5000 hectares What should the community accept per hectare per year in payments for the capture of carbon inside the 5,000

hectares that do not have a payment within the area of conservation?
6.3¿What is the least the community will accept in carbon payments for conservation?
6.4 – In many cases, payments for carbon require that the recipients plant trees where there are none. What will the
community accept per hectare per year to cut down coffee plantations and plant forest trees?
6.5 - What is the least the community would accept per hectare per year to cut down coffee plantations and plant forest trees?

*Thanks to David Runsten and Jessa Lewis as some sections have been adapted from their survey titled Café, Migration y desarrollo rural en el sur de Mexico. Ecuesta 2005/2006
** Methods adapted from Southgate et al. 2009 Payments for environmental services and rural livelihood strategies in Ecuador and Guatemala. Environment and Development Economics
15:21-37
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Appendix II – Structured Survey, Spanish
Encuesta Estructurada de Hogares para el proyecto: Paisajes sustentables de la Chinantla: Pagos por
Servicios Hidrológicos y el abandono de café*
¿Los pagos por servicios hidrológicos reducen la pobreza y fortalecen el capital social? Análisis del bienestar de los hogares y la toma de decisiones en la Sierra
Norte de Oaxaca

Nombre del encuestador
Lindsey
1
Otro
4
______________________

Fecha de la encuesta

Guia:

Protocolo: 1) hagas cita en la casa 2)preguntas por el jefe 3) si no esté el jefe, hacer la entrevista con la esposa o a un hijo
mayor
Introducción:
/Buenas tardes. Mi nombre es _______Soy parte de un equipo de investigación del CIIDIR-Oaxaca y la Universidad
Internacional de la Florida en los Estados Unidos. Estoy trabajando con Elvira Durán y David Bray. Estoy estudiando los
pagos por servicios hidrológicos recibidos por la comunidad. Esta debe tomar un hora de su tiempo. Contamos con el permiso
del comisariado para hacer la investigación en la comunidad. Todos los datos y información que usted me dé durante la
encuesta va a servir de parte de mi estudio solamente y son totalmente confidenciales. Si usted decide participar en el estudio
le hare una serie de preguntas esperando que su respuestas sean lo más completas posible porque los datos que recopilemos
podrían servir a la comunidad. ¿Me permite continuar?
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Comunidad :_______________________________
(SCT – Santa Cruz Tepetotutla; SPT – San Pedro Tlatepusco)

1.6 Usted ha tenido cargos en el
comisariado?

Seccción 1 – Demografía de Casas

1

1.1Jefe de la Familia

2

1.2 Nombre___________________________ 1.3 Género
1.4 Edad ___________________

H_____M______

1.5 Estado Civil ______________

O puede ser ¿en qué año nació?

3
4

(pregunta el guía)

Datos de la vivienda:
1.7 Tipo de piso de vivienda:
(¿Cuál?_______________)

____ tierra

____ cemento . ____ loseta

____ mosaico

____ otro

1.8 Tipo de material con el que está construida principalmente las paredes de la vivienda:
___ ladrillo

___ madera

____ palos y palma

____adobe

____ adobe ____ cemento

1.9 Tipo de material con el que esta construida principalmente el techo de la vivienda: ___ lamina ____ teja _____ palma
1.10 ¿Cuántos cuartos tiene la vivienda? _______
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1.11 ¿Con que tipo de servicio sanitario y drenaje cuenta?:
____baño con drenaje

____ letrina rústica

____ letrina seca

____ ninguno

Cuadra 1.12 1.12 Ahora me quisiera hacerle algunas preguntas acerca de cada persona que actualmente viven en su casa
Primero, me podría decir cuántos personas viven en su casa? _____
No. a) Nombre
b) Relación con el Jefe
c) Edad d) Nivel de
e) se emigro f) ¿Aporte
de Familia
Educación
por un
con dinero
Jefe ……………….……1
tiempo al
al hogar? Si
Esposa………….…….2
Preescolar . . . . . ..1
Norte?
o No
Hijo o Hija..………...…..3
Primaria 1-3…..…2
SI/No
Hermano (a)……………4
Primaria 4-6.…….3
Secundaria………4
Preparatoria……..5
Licenciatura..……6
No asistió…….….7
Otro...……………8

Abuelo (a).……………..5
Tío o Tía…….…………6
Primo…………………..7
Suegro (a)........................8
Padre o Madre………….9
Yerno………..………...10
Nuera………………….11
Prima.…………………12
Otro familiar…………..13
Sin Relación….……….14

1

1

2

2

¿Cual?

Si

3
4
5
6
7
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8
9
10
1.13 ¿Cuantos hijos tiene en total? ______
1.13a ¿De ellos, cuantos viven en su casa? _______________
1.13b ¿Cuantos viven en la comunidad? ______________ 1.13c ¿cuántos viven fuera de la comunidad?
___________
1.13f ¿Cuantos hijos han murieron? _______

SECCIÓN 2 – Personas que contribuyen con dinero a la casa
Ahora quisiera hacer algunas preguntas sobre los ingresos que llegan a la casa. Quisiera aclararle que la información que usted
me dé es confidencial solo la voy a usar por mi estudio. El comisariado sabe de estés preguntas y también mi guía.
2.1 Usted recibe dinero mandado de familiares que están fuera de la casa?
Si____ No___
Cuadra 2.2 Familiares que mandan dinero a su casa.
a) Nombre de familiares
que mandan dinero

b) ¿Dónde
está?

c) ¿Ha
d) ¿Cada cuando
mandado en
manda o trae dinero?
los últimos 12 (por ejemplo, cada 2
meses? (sí/no) semanas, cada 4
meses, etc.)

1
2
3
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e) ¿Qué cantidad le manda
o le trae cada vez? (indique
si es pesos o dólares)

f) calculation

4
5
6

Activos Agricolas. Ahora voy a preguntar sobre sus actividades agrícolas.
Café
2.3 ¿Cuántos hectáreas de café tienen las personas que viven en la casa? _____ En que tantas parceles? _______ (probe for
old abandoned plots that they may not remember)
2.4 ¿Ud. vendió café el año pasado? Si___ No___
2.5 ¿Cuál fue su producción total en kilos de pergamino seco en el último ciclo?_________ kilos
2.5a ¿A quién le vendió?

1)

Organización Cafetalera

2)

Coyote

3)

Otro:

b) ¿Cuántos kilos?

c) ¿a como le
pagaron el kilo?

d) ¿Cuánto le pagaron
por todo su café?

2.6. En sus parcelas de café activo, tiene otros plantes? Si____ No______
2.6a ¿Qué?_______________________________________________________
2.7. En sus parcelas de café activo, tiene otros plantes o ha convertido a otros usos? Si____ No______
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e) Kilos x Price
=

2.7a ¿Qué?_______________________________________________________

Maíz
2.11 ¿Cuántas hectáreas de rozo tienen las personas que viven en la casa? ________2.11a ¿En qué tantas parceles? _______
2.12 Cuantos se rindió en kilos por hectárea el año pasado? ______ 2.12a

Otros Cultivos que se vende
2.14 ¿Además del café, tiene otros productos cultivados o que usted recolecta que también vende? Si ___ No ___

2.14 a) Cultivo
(Guasmol, tepejilote, naranja,
plátano ect. . . .)

b) ¿Cuánto vendió en los últimos
12 meses?

cantidad

Medida

1)

2)

3)

Ganado y Animales Traspatio

164

c) ¿Qué precio recibió por
medida?

d) Calculation

2.15 ¿Usted tiene ganado? Si ____ No _____
No____

2.15a ¿Usted vendió algún ganado el año pasado? Si ___

2.15b ¿Usted vendió algún animal de traspatio el año pasado? Si ___ No___
2.15c ¿Cual?

d) ¿Cuantos?

e) ¿A qué precio?

f) $ por el año

1
2
3

TRABAJO EN PARCELAS AJENAS DE PERSONAS DE LA CASA
Cuadra 2.16 ¿Usted o otros miembros de su casa trabajan como mozo? Si___ No ___
a) Nombre

b) ¿Cuánto le pagan por día?

c) ¿Cuántos días trabaja
de jornalero en el maíz?

d) ¿Cuántos días trabaja de
jornalero en el café?

e) $ por el año

1
2
3

Otros Fuentes de Ingresos

Ahora quisiera hacer preguntas sobre otras fuentes de ingresos que tienen los miembros de la casa.
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2.17 ¿Alguien en la casa tiene alguna fuente de ingreso como venta de comida, venta de miel o de envasados, trabajo como chofer, trabajo
de guía o alguno otro trabajo? Si___ No ____
a) Miembro de b) Tipo de trabajo remunerado
la casa

c) ¿Cuánto gana usted por ano,
mes o semana u otro periodo en
esta actividad?

d) $ por el año

1)

2)

3)

2.18 ¿Tiene otro fuente de ingreso que no hemos mencionado? ___ Sí

___ No

SECCIÓN 3 – Fuentes de Ingreso de Programa de Gobierno
3.1 Usted recibe apoyo de PROCAMPO? Si_________No____________
3.1a Cuantas hectáreas tiene registradas con ProCampo __________________ (X 1300 = __________)
3.2 Usted recibe apoyo de OPPORTUNIDADES? Si_____ No_______ 3.2a Cuantos niños lo reciben? _______
¿Me podrías decir sus nombres?
No. b) Nombre del niño
c) Género
d) Grado escolar
e) Cantidad
f) cantidad por el
año
Hombre…………1
recibida cada
Mujer……….2
dos meses
1
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2
3
4
5
3.2g ¿Ustedes reciben el pago por el madre? Si ___ No ____

3.2h ¿Cuánto es el pago por el madre? _______/ dos meses

3.3 Alguien en la casa recibe pagos “SETENTA O MAS”? Si ____ No ____
No. 3.3a ¿Quien?
1
2

3.3b ¿Cuánto?

3.4 ¿Alguien ha recibido apoyos del programa de empleo temporal (PET)? Si___ No___
No 3.4a ¿ Quien?
3.4b ¿Cuantas veces?
3.4c ¿Cuanto recibe cada vez?
1
2
3

SECCION 4 - Apoyos No Monetarios
4.1 ¿Usted ha recibido un invernadero? Si ____ No ______

4.1a ¿tiene producción ahora? Si ____ No _____

4.4 ¿Usted ha recibido un proyecto de acuicultura? Si ___ No ___

4.2a ¿tiene producción ahora? Si ____ No _____

4.5 ¿Hay otros programas de alguna ONG o dependencia del gobierno que han beneficiado usted? Si ____ No _____
4.3a ¿ Cuáles son?
4.3b Organización
1

4.3c Programa
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2
3
4
5
6

SECCION 5 – PSAH
Ahora quisiera hacerle unas preguntas sobre los pagos por servicios hidrológicos
5.1 ¿Usted sabe porque a la comunidad le están dando pagos por servicios hidrológicos?
Si____ No_____
5.1 a ¿Porque?

5.2 ¿Para cuantos personas en la casa recibe dinero del hidrologico? _____
5.3 ¿Qué es la cosa más importante en que se ha gastado el dinero de los hidrológicos?

5.3ª ¿Qué es la caso segunda más importante en que se ha gastado el dinero de los hidrológicos?
5.5 ¿Hay un anciano en la casa que recibe un reparto de lo hidrológico? Si___ No ____ (X 200/mes = _____ SCT /
5.6 Antes del reparto ¿A qué uso le dio usted al fondo que han recibido del pago? (keep pressing them as they may have
forgotten)
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Uso
1

c) Cuantos veces que ha usado el
dinero en este manera

d) Cantidad usado

Gastos médicos

2 Mejoras en la vivienda
3 Actividades de
producción
4 Otros (especifique)

5.7 ¿Usted sabe que tantas de hectáreas están dentro del programa de PSAH? Si ___ No ____ 5.8a ¿Qué tantos? ______
5.8 ¿Cuáles son las restricciones sobre el uso del suelo del área que está en el programa?

5.9 ¿Cree usted que los pagos son distribuidos de manera igual dentro de la comunidad? Si_____ No_____
5.10a ¿Por qué?
5.10 ¿El apoyo por los pagos por servicios hidrológicos valen la pena por todas las restricciones que se han puesto en el bosque
por conservación?
Si____ No_____

5.11 (San Pedro) El reparto aquí es
¿Está de acuerdo con esto? Si _____ No _____ 5.12a ¿Por qué?
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5.12 ¿Su situación económica ha mejorado gracias al programa de los pagos por servicios hidrológicos? Si____ No____
5.13a ¿Por qué?
5.13 ¿Piensa usted que los 400 pesos por hectárea por ano que está dando el gobierno son suficiente? Si ___ No _____
5.13a Si dicen “no” . . . ¿Cuánto es lo menos que debe pagar por hectárea por año?

SECCION 6 – Disposición para aceptar pagos de carbono y otros**
Los árboles son muy importantes no sólo para el suministro de agua, sino también para el control climático mediante la reducción de
carbono, un contaminante que está causando el cambio climático. En muchas partes del mundo, los gobiernos y las empresas están
pagando a los dueños de terrenos para plantar árboles o para la conservación. En esta manera los compradores se ganan unos créditos
de carbono para vender en el mercado.

6.1 -¿Usted Estaría interesado en participar en un programa en el que se le pagaría por plantar árboles o seguir conservando los
bosques con el fin de limpiar el carbono del aire? Si_____ No_______
Cada otra encuesta explica que el precio del mercado es ahorita mas o meno 200 pesos por hectárea por año. Explica que por pedir menos está
perdiendo pero a pedir mucho mas significa que la gente pueden buscar otros lugares por el proyecto.

___ explica ___ no explica

6.2 -Ahora, la comunidad se gana 400 pesos por hectárea por año por los servicios hidrológicos. Con este dinero la
comunidad se paga por los gastos de comisariado, las actividades de conservación de recursos naturales y usted se gana un
parte. Ustedes tienen más de nueve mil hectáreas bajo de conservación pero solo cuatro mil están adentro del programa de
pagos por servicios ambientales. Entonces no hay pago por 5 mil hectáreas. ¿Qué aceptará la comunidad por hectárea por
año en pagos por la captura del carbón adentro de las 5 mil hectáreas que ya no tienen pago adentro del área de conservación?
6.3¿Qué es lo menos que puede aceptar la comunidad de pagos por la captura de carbón?
6.4 - En muchos casos, pagos por carbono requieren que se siembren arboles donde ya no hay. ¿Qué cantidad aceptará por
año por tumbar una hectárea de su cafetal y sembrar árboles del bosque?
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6.5 -¿Qué es lo menos que se puede aceptar por hectárea en pago por captura de carbono por tumbar un hectárea de su cafetal y
sembrar árboles del bosque?

*Thanks to David Runsten and Jessa Lewis as some sections have been adapted from their survey titled Café, Migration y desarrollo rural en el sur de Mexico. Ecuesta 2005/2006
** Methods adapted from Southgate et al. 2009 Payments for environmental services and rural livelihood strategies in Ecuador and Guatemala. Environment and Development Econo
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Appendix III – Semi Structured Survey, English

Semi Structured Interview
Name:

Date:

Cargos:
Notes:
1. Describe how the community entered the PSAH program?
2. Why did the community decide to participate in the program?
3. ¿How difficult was it to enter the program? For example, how many meetings or
trips to Oaxaca were required?
4. Were there people in the community who opposed the idea of the community
entering the PSAH program?
5. What makes up the costs of administration?
a. ¿Do you believe that the Money from the PSAH that is designated for
administrative costs has allowed the leadership to function better than
before?
b. Has participation in the PSAH improved trust in the community leadership?
6. How has the money from the PSAH been used?
7. In terms of the money held in the bank, has there ever been a time that an
individual has requested use of this money and it has been denied?
8. Has participation in the PSAH program changed the confidence community
members have in government officials?
9. Other than trust, how has the community benefited from the PSAH program?
10. Has participation in the PSAH brought any negative effects to the community?
11. Did participation in the PSAH program influence the foundation of CORENCHI?
How?
12. Has participation in the PSAH program improved relationships between
communities?

172

Appendix IV – Semi Structured Survey, Spanish

Entrevista Semi-estructurado
Nombre:

Fecha:

Cargos:
Notas:
13. ¿Como fue que la comunidad se entro del programa?
14. ¿Por qué la comunidad decide participar en el programa?
15. ¿Qué tan complicado fue poder estar en este programa? ¿Cuántas reuniones y
cuantos viajes a Oaxaca se requirieron pr ejemplo?
16. ¿Habia gente en la comunidad que so opuso a la participación de la comunidad en
este programa?
17. En que consiste los gastos del comisariado?
a. ¿Usted cree que este dinero ha servido para que el comisariado de bienes
comunales trabaje mejor?
b. ¿La participación en el programa ha mejorado la confianza en los
representantes y lideres e las comunidades?
18. Como ha usado el dinero de los pagos por la conservación?
19. En cuanto los repartos individuales ¿alguna vez se ha rechazado la solicitud de un
comunero cuando pide su dinero?
20. ¿La participación en el programa de PSA ha cambiado la confianza de la
comunidad hacia las dependencias del gobierno?
21. Ademas de confianza, ¿Cómo ha mejorado la comunidad a partir de que se
recibieron los pagos por servicios ambientales?
22. ¿Hay aspectos negativos que ha traído la comunidad el programa de PSA?
23. ¿La inscripción al programa de pagos por servicios ambientales influyo en la
fundación de CORENCHI?
24. ¿El programa de PSA ha fortalecido la organización de las comunidades para la
conservación?
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